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PATENTING ABSTRACTIONS*
Miriam Bitton
This Article explores whether abstract ideas can and should be
patentable. Historically, the patent system's scope has been restricted
to protecting tangible products or processes as opposed to abstract
ideas.
Ongoing advances in information technologies, however, have
blurred the boundaries of the traditional doctrine, and many
recently issued patents appear to protect abstractions. A recent
U.S. Supreme Court decision, Bilski v. Kappos, provided new, but
vague, guidance on subject matter eligibility thresholds, leaving
the question of the patentability of abstract ideas open. This
Article addresses Bilski's vague guidance both by descriptively
showing that domestic patent law has consistently excluded
abstract ideas and by proposing a more robust framework for
assessing the patentability of abstractions. The proposed framework
can be applied to the highly contested questions of whether
business methods, computer software, and diagnostic methods
each constitute patentable inventions. This Article concludes with
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the argument that the Federal Circuit's updated approach in State
Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group was inevitable and is
consistent with the information economy while the Federal
Circuit's and Supreme Court's decisions in Bilski v. Kappos and
Mayo v. Prometheus reflect stagnation and an ill-devised policy
making process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO") issued its first-ever patent for a legal method. The
patent covered a tax strategy designed to minimize federal estate
taxes through the use of a grantor-retained annuity trust.' This
represents just one example of new patents that seem to capture
abstractions. The USPTO has since issued about a dozen legal
method patents, with an unknown number of legal method
applications currently pending.2 Today, there are many more
patents issued over what seem to be pure abstract inventions in a
variety of fields including insurance, marketing, and retirement
plans.3
U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999).
2 See Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
109th Cong. 11-15 (2006) (statement of Mark Everson, Comm'r, IRS); see also
e.g., Method and Apparatus for Modeling and Executing Deferred Award
Instrument Plan, U.S. Patent No. 6,609,111 (filed Oct. 18, 2000) (explaining that
an invention which administers various deferred compensation programs that
can reduce an individual's estate or income tax). See generally Andrew A.
Schwartz, The Patent Office Meets the Poison Pill: Why Legal Methods Cannot
Be Patented, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 333 (2007) (exploring the patentability of
legal tax methods and suggesting that they should not be patentable). As part of
the new America Invents Act of 2011, Congress has sought to ban
government-granted patents for tax-planning strategies. See Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act § 14, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) ("For
purposes of evaluating an invention under section 102 or 103 of title 35, United
States Code, any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability,
whether known or unknown at the time of the invention or application for
patent, shall be deemed insufficient to differentiate a claimed invention from the
prior art."). The proposed change responds to critics who see the new trend as a
"symbol of the flaws in both the tax and intellectual-property systems, where
companies have devoted significant effort to cutting their tax bills, and in some
cases essentially equate[d] clever accounting schemes with innovations like a
new semiconductor or a pharmaceutical product." Greg Hitt, Politics &
Economics: Ban on Tax-Plan Patents?; Congress Is Skeptical of Their
Legitimacy, WALL ST. J., A8 (Sept. 24, 2007).
3 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,642,768 (filed Mar. 8, 1984) (providing College
Savings Bank with a patent on its insurance product used for funding a college
education); U.S. Patent No. 5,136,502 (filed Oct. 2, 1991) (patenting a computer
system used to fund and manage retiree health care benefits by employing a
156 [VOL. 15: 153
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This phenomenon deserves attention because it constitutes a
departure from the traditional understanding of intellectual
property regimes. Patent law and copyright law aim to provide
incentives for the creation of socially desirable goods through the
endowment of a monopoly grant for a limited period. The U.S.
Constitution provides in Article I, Section 8 that Congress shall
have the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . ."
This clause forms the basis for grants of copyrights and patents.
Copyright law and patent law generally define the protected
subject matter under their respective statutes.
Historically, patent protection has extended to functional
technological works falling into four types of subject matter: (i)
processes; (ii) machines; (iii) articles of manufacture; and (iv)
compositions of matter-all of which are historically limited to
tangible products and processes.' Moreover, patent law traditionally
steered clear of purely informational works that have no function
other than to inform, entertain, or present an appearance to human
beings.! As a result, patent and copyright law protected two separate
and distinct categories: nonfunctional subject matter (copyrights)
and functional subject matter (patents).' While there had been very
Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association trust that in turn purchases
variable life insurance contracts on a selected group of employees); U.S. Patent
No. 5,235,507 (filed Jan. 16, 1990) (providing patent protection to a health
insurance management system for software that verifies the insurance status of
the claimant; identifies the appropriate insurance policy; calculates the amount
to be paid to the health care provider; pays the provider; and calculates and
debits the amount to be paid by the claimant).
4 See, e.g., Sony v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (concerning copyright law); 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2006) (pertaining to patent law).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see also Dennis Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and
Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L. REv. 439, 453 (2003) (tracing the
historical reasons for the difference between patent law and copyright law
subject matter eligibility).
8 Karjala, supra note 7, at 453.
9 Id.
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little need to draw additional subject matter boundaries between
copyright law and patent law, the recent advent of information
technologies has begun to blur the distinction.
The introduction of computer software was one of the most
significant challenges to the patent system and intellectual property
law regimes. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, judges,
legislators, and prominent legal scholars around the world tried to
find a way to fit software into existing intellectual property law
regimes. Predictably, software raised a significant challenge as it
is both a functional product that could be handled through the
patent system, and also a written code that could be addressed
through copyright law. Because of the complex nature of software,
it has been a challenge to fit it easily into existing patent and
copyright law regimes.o
Abstract inventions, potentially including computer software,
are patentable largely because of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group Inc." The case essentially eliminated
patentable subject matter eligibility thresholds and suggested that
any invention with a tangible, concrete, and useful result can be
patentable. 2 However, both the Federal Circuit, in In re Bilski,"
10 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994) (discussing
the protection of computer program and suggesting the creation of a sui generis
regime for protection rather than using exiting intellectual property regimes such
as patent law or copyright law); Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of
Algorithms, 47 Prr. L. REV. 959 (1986) (arguing that software is patentable);
Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection For Computer Programs, Databases,
and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 977 (1993) (defending application of copyright law to software); A.
Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright than for Patent Protection of
Computer Programs, 72 NEB. L. REv. 351 (1993) (arguing that patents are
appropriate for software).
" 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
12 Id. at 1375 ("For purpose of our analysis, as noted above, claim 1 is
directed to a machine programmed with the Hub and Spoke software and
admittedly produces a 'useful, concrete, and tangible result.' . . . This renders it
statutory subject matter, even if the useful result is expressed in numbers, such
as price, profit, percentage, cost, or loss.") (emphasis added).
" 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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and the Supreme Court, in Bilski v. Kappos,' more recently
reexamined subject matter eligibility thresholds, holding that State
Street's patentability test allowed too many ineligible inventions
into the patent system." The Supreme Court, nevertheless, failed
to provide clear guidance concerning the threshold inquiry for
subject matter eligibility.16
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.'" only made matters
more ambiguous. In Mayo, the Court held that a personalized
medicine dosing process was ineligible for patent protection
because the process was effectively a law of nature, and that
combining a law of nature with well-known elements does not
justify the grant of a patent monopoly.'" The Court emphasized
that the claims were overly broad because they were not confined
to any particular useful application, suggesting that the different
steps in the claims "add nothing specific to the laws of nature other
than what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity,
previously engaged in by those in the field." 9
This Article explores the question of whether abstractions can
or should be patentable in light of the lack of bright-line rules. Part
II offers an historical setting regarding subject matter eligibility,
showing that patent protection was confined to tangible
applications rather than abstraction. Part III shows that patent law
has, until recently, consistently excluded abstract ideas from patent.
protection through ill-defined gatekeeping mechanisms designed to
keep abstractions within the public domain. As a result of the
increased production of information technologies, however, courts
have either stopped using the mechanisms to keep abstractions
14 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
" Id at 3229.
"See id. at 3227-31.
' 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
Id. at 1297 ("If a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process
reciting a law of nature, unless that process has additional features that provide
practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the law of nature itself. A patent, for example, could not simply
recite a law of nature and then add the instruction 'apply the law.' ").
1 Id. at 1299-1300.
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public or used them less frequently. Part III also reviews Supreme
Court and Federal Circuit rulings during the last forty years on
subject matter eligibility, showing that the courts' analyses have
consistently centered upon finding a physical anchor. These
analyses in turn serve to exclude abstractions and act as a proxy for
more complex concerns of the courts pertaining to abstractions.
Part IV suggests a more robust theoretical framework for assessing
the patentability of abstractions by identifying and assessing the
strength of a rich set of rationales for excluding abstractions,
including economic, justice-property based, constitutional, and
structural-constraint rationales.
With these insights, Part V explores the framework's utility in
assessing the patentability of highly contested categories of
inventions, such as business methods, computer software, and
diagnostic methods. This Article then concludes that the Federal
Circuit's approach in State Street was inevitable, more responsive
to, and consistent with today's information economy, while the
Federal Circuit's and Supreme Court's decisions in Bilski reflect
stagnation and an ill-devised policy-making process. Because the
search for physical anchoring in the courts' decisions is not
grounded in any persuasive rationale, physical anchoring should
not be a decisive factor in patentability analysis.
II. HISTORICAL SETTING
Although the protection of intellectual property is theoretically
justified by the idea that it is analogous to property in tangible
objects,20 critics argue that intellectual property cannot be justified
by the same principles that underlie property. generally.2 Viewed
in the light of A.M. Honor6's classical-philosophical account of
the fundamental elements of ownership,22 it seems nonsensical to
20 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J.
287, 296-97 (1988).
21 See generally Peter Drahos, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
48-49 (1st ed. 1996).22 See LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS
18-19 (1977) (explaining Honord's notion that full ownership is explicated by
reference to the following elements: the right to possess, the right to use, the
right to manage, the right to the income, the right to the capital, the right to
160 [VOL. 15: 153
Patenting Abstractions
categorize intellectual property as the same as tangible property.
Many of tangible property's ownership elements, such as
possession and the right to capital, do not apply to intellectual
property.2 3 It is difficult to possess a patentable idea in the same
way as a tangible asset, and it is also very difficult to imagine the
consumption of an intangible idea, as compared to the
consumption of a tangible good.
In 1769, Judge Joseph Yates delivered a dissenting opinion in
Millar v. Taylor24 opposing the recognition of property rights in
purely intangible "ideas" and "sentiments."2 5 Yates's dissent may
seem like the product of a bygone age in which land served as the
primary paradigm for property, but more modem judges also
expressed similar views. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, for
example, stated that protection of intellectual property through
copyright:
[R]estrains the spontaneity of men where but for it there would be
nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit. It is a
prohibition of conduct remote from the persons or tangibles of the party
having the right.26
In spite of these inherent difficulties, legal systems introduced
intellectual property regimes.
However, this does not mean that accommodating intangible
inventions has been an easy task. Subject matter eligibility
questions have arisen and challenged many patent systems as
patent law consistently demonstrated animosity towards patenting
abstractions.2 7 Under traditional eighteenth and nineteenth century
conceptions of patentable subject matter, patents for processes
were limited to processes tied to a particular apparatus or that
transformed matter from one state to another. 28 Tangibility seemed
security, the power of transmissibility, the absence of term, the prohibition of
harmful use, liability to execution, and residuary character).
23 See EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS 6 (1st ed. 1879).
24 [1769] 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.).
25 Id. at 230.
26 White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908)
(Holmes, J., concurring).
27 See infra Part III.A.
28 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1980).
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to be the touchstone for patent protection, 29 and was consistent
with the industrial applications environment in which these rules
were crafted.30 As the discussion that follows shows, abstractions
could not be patented because they were not tangible and did not
fit into any of the recognized patentable subject matter categories,
such as a machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or process.
Despite this common animosity towards patenting abstractions,
the Constitution does not offer clear instructions as to subject
matter eligibility and abstractions' patentability. The Constitution
states that Congress has the power to grant to "[i]nventors" limited
exclusive rights in their "[d]iscoveries" in order to promote the
progress of "useful [a]rts."3 The Constitution does not define
inventors, discoveries, or useful arts, however, and the Supreme
Court has refrained from adding much clarity to the meaning of
these terms. Although the Court did expressly state that "it is only
useful arts . .. that can be made the subject of a patent,"32 it has not
defined the term "useful arts."" The Court has, however, limited
the phrase by excluding natural phenomena, laws of nature, and
abstract ideas from patent protection.3 4 In addition, lower courts
have suggested on multiple occasions that useful arts means
"technological arts," though this definition does not provide any
29 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, How Can You Patent Genes?, 2 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 3, 5 (2002).
30 The first Patent Act was enacted during the late eighteenth century.
Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the first Patent Act addressed types of
innovations characteristic of that era, all of which are physical inventions. See
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12 (1790). See generally Edward C.
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts: The
Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1994).
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally Edward C. Walterscheid,
"Within the Limits of the Constitutional Grant": Constitutional Limitations on
the Patent Power, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 291, 331-54 (2002) (discussing
patentable subject matter from a historical perspective).
32 Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co. (The Telephone Cases), 126 U.S. 1, 533
(1888).
33 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3243 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 18 (1829).
34 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226.
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better instruction.3 ' Different interpretations suggested by numerous
commentators also fail to offer helpful guidance.36 As one
commentator stressed, the Framers of the Constitution created a
significant interpretational problem when they chose to use the
term "discoveries" in the clause." It is likely that the Framers
viewed the term "discoveries" as synonymous with "invention"
simply because the clause suggests that discoveries are the work
product of inventors.38 However, the eighteenth century definition
of discoveries was broad enough to encompass more than the
creation of something new; it embraced the process of searching
for and finding something that existed but had not yet been
revealed." Congress, like the Framers, seems to have accepted the
two terms as synonymous.4 0
The language of the Patent Act is only slightly more
informative. The statutory definition of patentable subject matter
has changed only semantically since the first patent statute, the
Patent Act of 1790.4' The Patent Act of 1790 authorized patents
for "any useful art, manufacture, engine, or device, or any
improvement therein not before known or used."42 The Act of
" In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For example, in Ex Parte
Lundgren, the majority of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
reversed an examiner's rejection of a patent application on a claim for a business
method that described a method of compensating a manager, suggesting that
there existed no separate "technological arts" test for patentability. Ex Parte
Lundgren, No. 2003-2088, 2004 WL 3561262 at *5 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 20, 2004).
36 See, e.g., Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of
Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 5, 10 (1966) (suggesting that the term
meant useful or helpful trades in 1787); Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the
Statutory Useful Arts (Part 11), 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 487, 496 (1952) ("It seems
clear that 'useful arts' (as a unitary technical term) embraced the so-called
industrial, mechanical and manual arts of the 18th century."); Karl B. Lutz, Are
the Courts Carrying Out Constitutional Public Policy on Patents?, 34 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 766, 771 (1952) ("It is clear from the above that 'useful arts' meant
what we now call 'technology,' or 'applied science.' ").
3 Edward C. Walterscheid, Originalism and the IP Clause: A Commentary on
Professor Oliar's "New Reading", 58 UCLA L. REV. Disc. 113, 123-24 (2010).
38 Id
39 id.
40 id.
41 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980).
42 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12 (1790).
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1793 was amended to authorize patents for "any new and useful
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or
useful improvement [thereofj."
This revised definition of patentable subject matter was
retained until 1952, when the term "art" was replaced with
"process."44 According to Section 101 of the current Act, a person
who "invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or any composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor." 45 Although
three of these categories-machines, compositions of matter, and
articles of manufacture-refer to physical artifacts themselves and
have presented scant interpretational difficulty for courts, the
fourth category-process-has proven decidedly more
challenging. This is especially the case where the abstract
innovation or process at issue completely lacks physicality.
Because the Patent Act itself offers little assistance in clarifying
what constitutes a patentable process,46 it is helpful to turn next to
historical jurisprudence.
The fact that a process patent claim does not encompass
abstract, intangible processes seemed clear-at least under
nineteenth century case law. Perhaps the earliest discussion of the
nature of process patents by the Supreme Court occurred in 1853
with Corning v. Burden.47  The Court explained the difference
between a machine and a process in the following manner:
The term machine includes every mechanical device . . . to perform
some function and produce a certain effect or result. But where the
result or effect is produced by chemical action, by the operation or
application of some element or power of nature, or of one substance to
another, such modes, methods, or operations, are called processes. ...
The arts of tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing
43 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
4 Id.
45 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
46 The Patent Act circularly defines process to mean "process, art, or method,
and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, or material." Id. § 100(b).
47 56 U.S. 252 (1854).
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India rubber, smelting ores, and numerous others, are usually carried on
48
by processes . . . .
Twenty-four years later, the Court's decision in Cochrane v.
Deener49 provided a definition for process that remains the most
frequently quoted explanation of the term."o The Court defined
process as only including actions transforming matter from one
physical state into another (such as a chemical reaction).
Specifically, the Court stated: "A process is a mode of treatment
of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a
series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed
and reduced to a different state or thing.""
Additionally, the early cases also suggested that principles are
excluded from patent protection and, although employing different
terminology, they essentially excluded abstractions from patent
protection. This exclusion was created in order to add clarity to the
scope of patentable subject matter in the IP Clause and the Patent
Act. These cases consistently held that no one could obtain
exclusive rights in principles, although their practical applications
were patentable.
The earliest American case to discuss the unpatentability of
principles was Whitney v. Carter52 in 1810." Whitney instituted an
action against Carter for infringement of his cotton ginning
patent.54 Carter alleged that Whitney's gin was not novel because
an earlier machine was the same "in principle" as Whitney's gin.5
Whitney disagreed, alleging that even if the principle of the two
machines was identical, the application of that principle was
different.5 6  The court agreed, holding that "the legal title to a
48 1d at 267.
49 94 U.S. 780 (1877).
o See id. at 788.
Id (emphasis added).
52 29 F. Cas. 1070 (C.C.D. Ga. 1810) (No. 17,583).
51Id. at 1070.
54 Id at 1071.
ss Id
56 Id. ("[Whitney] defined the term 'principle,' as applied to the mechanic arts,
to mean the elements and rudiments of those arts, or, in other words, the first
grounds and rule for them. That for a mere principle a patent cannot be
obtained. That neither the elements, nor the manner of combining them, nor
JAN. 2014] 165
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patent consists, not in a principle merely, but in an application of a
principle, whether previously in existence or not, to some new and
useful purpose."" This was a commonly agreed upon proposition."
In summary, while neither the Constitution nor the Patent Act
explicitly excludes abstractions or abstract processes, patent
protection has been traditionally confined to tangible application
rather than abstract principles and the Supreme Court's definition
of process suggests that physical transformation has been the
touchstone for the patentability of processes. As the next section
will discuss, several patent doctrines emerged over the years that
screened out abstractions from patent protection.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF THE GATEKEEPERS OF ABSTRACTIONS
Over the years, courts have created various abstraction
"gatekeepers." This Part discusses the gatekeeping mechanisms by
analyzing their rationales and their applications in court. As this
Part shows, the exclusion of abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and
laws of nature, although vague, has been the only meaningful and
stable tool at the court's disposal to exclude problematic subject
matter. Additionally, more specific gatekeeping mechanisms were
essentially aimed at addressing concerns already covered by the
general exclusion, thus failing to offer meaningful guidance and
resulting in their decline.
even the effect produced, can be the subject of a patent; and that it can only be
obtained for the application of this effect to some new and useful purpose."
(emphasis added)).
5 Id. at 1072-73 (emphasis added).
58 See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1124 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) ("So
if the principles of the machine are new, either to produce a new or an old effect,
the inventor may well entitle himself to the exclusive right of the whole
machine. By the principles of a machine, (as these words are used in the statute)
is not meant the original elementary principles of motion, which philosophy and
science have discovered, but the modus operandi, the peculiar device or manner
of producing any given effect.").
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A. Exclusion ofAbstract Ideas, Natural Phenomena, and Laws of
Nature: Keeping Basic Tools of Science within the Public
Domain
The Supreme Court consistently reiterates that laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas do not constitute patentable
subject matter.59 These exclusions reflect the fundamental concept
that patents are issued only for new means to achieve useful
results,60 rather than for something akin to the discovery of a
scientific principle.
Courts have offered different rationales for all these exclusions,
doing it at times in an implicit manner. The most commonly
asserted rationale is that the patent system was devised to protect
means of implementation rather than mere concepts.6'
Additionally, courts have suggested that protecting these categories
would effectively extend protection over means neither invented
nor described by the applicant,62 and that such items are basic,
fundamental tools of scientific and technological work. Granting
an exclusive right to such tools might impede future inventions and
discoveries.63  The Supreme Court, in Gottschalk v. Benson,'
59 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).60 See, e.g., Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 881 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1862) (No. 9,865) ("It is only where the explorer has gone beyond the mere
domain of discovery, and has laid hold of the new principle, force, or law, and
connected it with some particular medium or mechanical contrivance by which,
or through which, it acts on the material world, that he can secure the exclusive
control of it under the patent laws.").
61 See, e.g., Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874) ("An
idea of itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made
practically useful is.").
62 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) ("No
man can have a right to cut ice by all means or methods, or by all or any sort of
apparatus, although he is not the inventor of any or all of such means, methods,
or apparatus."); see also O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1854) (suggesting
that by generally claiming the concept of electromagnetism as a means to
communicate, Morse effectively sought to patent the principle itself). But see
Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REv. 591, 591-92 (2008)
(suggesting that most if not all subject matter eligibility cases reflect concerns
pertaining to other patentability criteria rather than thresholds questions).
63 See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948) ("[P]atents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature.
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stated the rationale succinctly: "Phenomena of nature, though just
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are
not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work."6  Other courts have explained that such items
are not created but are simply discovered.66
B. The Mental Steps Doctrine: Excluding Thoughts, the Liberal
Arts, and Abstract Ideas
The "mental steps" doctrine has been used to deny patent
protection for certain processes or methods that involve human
intervention. It reflects an attempt to circumscribe the breadth of
patent monopolies and safeguard the sanctity of human thought
and the values of the First Amendment." The mental steps
The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the
qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men.")
(citation omitted); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853) ("A principle, in
the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be
patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.").
64409 U.S. 63 (1972).
65 Id. at 67; see also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc.,
548 U.S. 124, 128 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer
explained that laws of nature are not protectable, not because they are obvious,
easy, or not useful, but because of "a basic judgment that protection in such
cases, despite its potentially positive incentive effects, would too often severely
interfere with, or discourage, development and the further spread of useful
knowledge itself." Id. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980),
Justice Burger similarly stated that "[t]he laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas have been held not patentable." Id. at 309 ("Thus, a new
mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable
subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that
E=MC2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.").
66 See, e.g., Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175 (holding that "[n]or can an exclusive right
exist to a new power, should one be discovered in addition to those already
known"). But see Stephen McKenna, Patentable Discovery?, 33 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1241, 1276-77 (1996) (suggesting that the concerns with granting patent
protection to discoveries are overstated and therefore the courts and the patent
office should explicitly recognize the patentability of discoveries that are not
inventions, subject to the same statutory constraints imposed on inventions).
67 See generally Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L.
REV. 317 (2007) (discussing the problems arising when patent claims recite acts
of thinking); Kevin Emerson Collins, Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law
and the Problem of Insufficient Thought Control, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 759 (2007)
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doctrine, however, is ill-defined and its demise is attributable to the
vagueness of its underlying rationales. The modem Supreme
Court, nevertheless, still mentions the mental steps doctrine
alongside other doctrines, suggesting its continued viability.68
Courts have offered different rationales for the doctrine, either
explicitly or implicitly. In In re Abramsj the United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA") stated: "Citation of
authority in support of the principle that claims to mental concepts
. . . are not patentable is unnecessary. It is self-evident that thought
is not patentable.""o In Benson, the Supreme Court declared that
mental processes are not patentable and that, like abstract ideas and
laws of nature, mental processes are "basic tools of scientific and
technological work."'
The cases decided under the mental steps doctrine demonstrate
a concern with patenting abstract ideas. However, given the
common factual scenarios of mental steps cases it is more logical
to view the emergence of the doctrine as reflecting a concern that
protecting abstract ideas might discourage people from simply
taking measurements, making calculations, interpreting data, or
pursuing any other form of information processing.
One of the earliest mental steps cases, Ex parte Meinhardt,72
ruled that a method involving human measurement and calculation
for a "system for spacing free-hand letters" on a page73 was not
eligible for a patent because the only protectable process claims
(discussing problems with the patenting of thoughts).
68 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195-96 (1981).
69 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).7 0 Id. at 168.
7 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); see also Pamela Samuelson,
Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection jor Algorithms and Other
Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1127, 1145 (1990)
(arguing that there is no perceived need for an incentive to encourage the
inventions of new mental processes and referring to the difficulty of enforcing
patent rights in mental processes and the greater probability of independent
invention with regard to mental processes). But see Donald S. Chisum, The
Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REv. 959, 970 (1986) (criticizing
Benson).
72 Exparte Meinhardt, 1907 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 237.
73 Id.
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were either mechanical, chemical, or elemental processes,
implicitly suggesting that methods requiring only the use of the
human mind and writings were simply abstract and could not be
patented.74 Other early mental processes cases seem to have been
decided on the basis of the abstract, algorithmic nature of the
claim."
During the 1940s, the USPTO, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, and the CCPA recognized the mental steps doctrine.
In a series of cases, these courts reviewed claims based on
calculations, formulas, or other types of algorithms, rejected claims
as unpatentable under the mental steps doctrine,76 and in the 1950s
and 1960s, denied protection to additional processes. 7
74 Id. at 237-38; see also Warren T. Jessup, Patentability of Mental Processes,
40 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 482 (1958).
7s See, e.g., Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1932) (finding a
claim for a "method of counterbalancing engine main shafts" unpatentable
because the claim was simply a "patent on a mathematical formula for the
solution of a problem in dynamics" or "a monopoly of a formula for determining
dynamic forces" and "such a computation is not a 'new and useful art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter' ").
76 See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 146 F.2d 817, 821 (9th
Cir. 1944) (rejecting process claims for a method for determining the location of
an obstruction in an oil well because "these mental steps, even if novel, are not
patentable," explaining that the "method here claimed consists in setting down
three knowns in a simple equation and from them determining or computing an
unknown"); In re Heritage, 185 F.2d 972 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (finding that a claim
for a method of coating porous, sound-insulating fiber board with a minimum
reduction in insulating quality was unpatentable because "[s]uch purely mental
steps are not proper subject matter for protection under the patent statute,"
relying on another court's decision that found that a specified formula did not
involve patentable subject matter); Ex parte Read, 123 U.S.P.Q. 446 (B.P.A.I.
1943) (rejecting a claim to a method for determining the rate of speed of a
vehicle by using concentric logarithmic scales because it involved "purely a
mental act," although it appears that the method was nothing more than a
method for calculating speed using scales).
n See, e.g., In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (endorsing a set of
rules concerning mental steps processes: first, a process that is purely mental is
unpatentable; second, a process that contains mental and physical steps is
unpatentable if the advance over the prior art is found in the mental steps; and
third, if a process contains both physical and mental steps and the advance over
the prior art is found in the physical steps, the process is patentable).
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Probably due to a lack of clarity concerning the underlying
rationale of the doctrine, its application as a decisive factor in the
denial of patent applications gradually declined." More recent
Supreme Court decisions have mentioned mental processes as an
exception to patentability, 79 suggesting that the mental steps
doctrine remains relevant as an abstractions gatekeeper.o
Generally, however, the doctrine has lost its impact because of the
ease with which it can be avoided by tying an invention to some
physical means (for example, a computer), adding another
limitation,"' or disclaiming the scope covering human thinking.82
C. The Printed Matter Rule: Excluding Things in the Copyright
Law Domain
The "printed matter" rule aims to exclude printed materials,
such as literary texts, from patent protection. Case law on the
printed matter rule does not offer any explanation concerning the
rule's scope or underlying rationale. Some commentators have
suggested, however, that the genesis of the rule on printed matter
"is found in the long-standing rule that abstractions, mental
7 See, e.g., In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (holding that a
process "capable of performance without human intervention and directed to an
industrial technology ... is not precluded by the mere fact that the process could
alternatively be carried out by mental steps"); Ex parte McNabb, 127 U.S.P.Q.
456, 457-58 (B.P.A.I. 1959) ("Any method or step in a method which can be
manually performed and requires the use of the human eyes for detection or
determination of any condition, such as temperature, pressure, time, etc., and/or
the use of hands for the purpose of manipulating, such as turning off or on or
regulating a given device ... necessarily involves the human mind and hence
can be classed as a mental step. Such steps, however, are not purely mental or
interpretive steps and are not the kind which are prohibited by the decisions
relating to purely mental steps."); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A.
1970) (permitting patent protection for processes that were purely mental in
character only if the processes were so definite that they could be performed by
a properly programmed machine).
7 See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124
(2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
oId. at 136-37.
81 For example, adding elements that represent physical actions.
82 See Jeff Thurston, Echoes from the Past: How the Federal Circuit Continues
to Struggle with Patentable Subject Matter Post-Bilski, 77 Mo. L. REV. 591, 610
(2012).
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theories, or business methods are not patentable subject matter."8 3
Thus, like abstract ideas, theories, or business methods, the printed
matter rule purports to exclude the patenting of abstractions.
It is likely that the rule excludes printed matter and its content
because printed matter is not functional and as a result does not fall
within the scope of the "technological arts," notwithstanding the
difficulty one might experience understanding this phrase. More
importantly, the rule also reflects the division of labor between
copyright law and patent law, as copyright regulates nearly every
aspect of writing. Regardless of whether these rationales are the
true rationales underlying the printed matter rule, the rule's
existence and exceptions reflect the great caution exercised by
courts in determining whether to provide patent protection to
printed matter.
Like other gatekeepers, the printed matter rule provides a tool
for the exclusion of abstractions from the realm of patentable
material. Printed matter is not a "manufacture" and does not fit
into any of the classes of patentable subject matter. However, if
printed matter is integrated into some physical machine or
structure, it can be an element of a patentable claim.84
In the past, due to the courts' failure to offer a clear rationale
for both the printed matter rule and its exceptions, they struggled
with applying the exclusion. This failure stemmed from the
absence of a coherent thesis underpinning the doctrine. Some
early cases on printed matter considered various kinds of printed
business forms." In these cases, the courts usually found no
83 Note, The Patentability of Printed Matter: Critique and Proposal, 18 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 475, 476 (1950). See Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101:
Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379 (2010)
(providing a comprehensive analysis of the printed matter doctrine).
84 Compare In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming the
denial of a patent when a known product has merely had instructions added to
it), with In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (affirming patentability
where the printed matter, when integrated with the circular bands, produced a
new product incapable of serving its function without both the printed matter
and the physical band).
85 The rule had been used to deny patent protection to information
representation methods, texts (legal and other forms), and business forms. See,
e.g., Guthrie v. Curlett, 10 F.2d 725, 726 (2d Cir. 1926) (finding a "consolidated
172 [VOL. 15: 153
Patenting Abstractions
invention in the arrangement of the printed matter and found such
systems for doing business unpatentable, often deciding business
forms' failure on grounds of novelty or obviousness."
The exception to the printed matter rule emerged at about the
same time the rule came to life." A number of cases applied the
tariff index" unpatentable because it simply pertained to information
representation according to some rules, suggesting that "[a] new method . . . of
making directories . . . may be both new and useful; but the patent law is
prosaically practical, it can never get away from the necessity of means, and
unless patentable means of expressing or using the new idea are shown there can
be no valid patent"). For more cases that dealt with information organization,
see Flint v. G.R. Leonard & Co., 27 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1928) (finding a
reference guide showing comparative express rates and parcel post unpatentable
because "it does not contain the elements necessary to bring it within the scope
of a patentable invention"); In re Lockert, 65 F.2d 159, 160 (C.C.P.A. 1933)
(finding a chart for a postal scale unpatentable because the novel feature of the
chart was the arrangement of the printed matter and "there was no mechanical
relation or co-operation between [the] chart and the [scale] to which it is
attached"); In re Reeves, 62 F.2d 199 (C.C.P.A. 1932) (finding a real estate
valuation chart unpatentable because an "invention cannot rest alone in novel
printing arrangement"); see also Conover v. Coe, 99 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1938)
(finding a street railway coupon transfer ticket unpatentable); In re Haller, 161
F.2d 280 (C.C.P.A. 1947) (finding that a label on insecticide was merely the
application of particular printed matter to an old article that cannot render the
article patentable); In re Rice, 132 F.2d 140 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (denying patent
protection to music sheets); In re Johns, 70 F.2d 913 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (finding a
method of marking meat unpatentable subject matter); In re Sterling, 70 F.2d
910, 912 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (finding a new arrangement of check book
unpatentable); In re Dixon, 44 F.2d 881 (C.C.P.A. 1930) (finding a form of
promissory judgment note with attorney's fee clause and declaration of lien
unpatentable); Boyle v. Ladd, 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289 (D.D.C. 1963) (finding
a banking form unpatentable).
86 See, e.g., U.S. Credit Sys. Co. v. Am. Credit Indem. Co., 59 F. 139, 143 (2d
Cir. 1893) (finding a patent on a means of insuring merchants against bad-debt
losses invalid, suggesting that "[t]he three claims of the patent are concerned
solely with the providing of sheets with appropriate headings, adapted to be used
in preparing historical records of certain business transactions. There is nothing
peculiar or novel in preparing a sheet of paper with headings generally
appropriate to classes of facts to be recorded, and whatever peculiarity there
may be about the headings in this case is a peculiarity resulting from the
transactions themselves").
87 See, e.g., Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210 F. 443, 447 (6th Cir. 1913)
(finding a form of transfer ticket for street railways patentable because of the
new functional relationship between the printed matter and a distinctive physical
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exception to the printed matter rule, finding that a functional
relationship existed between the printed matter and the material on
which the printing was performed."
While the CCPA recognized the exception to the printed matter
rule, it also questioned the rule's integrity. In In re Gulack,89 the
CCPA rightly expressed its impatience with the rule.90 The Federal
Circuit later adopted these cautionary remarks uttered by the
CCPA.9'
In summary, the printed matter rule serves an important
function in excluding purely informational works, such as arguably
copyrightable content, purely informational works that are not
copyrightable content, and some abstract ideas.
D. The Business Methods Exception: Excluding Abstract Ideas
The "business methods" exception was yet another tool
employed by the courts to exclude abstract ideas. Like the other
exceptions discussed in this Part, the business methods exception
structure).
E.g., Myers v. Coe, 83 F.2d 708, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1940); In re Royka, 490
F.2d 981, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1974); Flood v. Coe, 31 F. Supp. 348, 349 (D.D.C.
1940) (finding a new price ticket for tagging garments in retail stores patentable
under the exception to the printed matter rule because there was a "definite and
decided relationship between the physical structure and the printed matter").
In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
90 Id. at 1385 n.8 ("A 'printed matter rejection under § 103 stands on
questionable legal and logical footing. Standing alone, the description of an
element of the invention as printed matter tells nothing about the differences
between the invention and the prior art or about whether that invention was
suggested by the prior art.").
9' See In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (vacating and
remanding the CCPA's decision not to grant a patent on basis of the CCPA
commissioner's concession that the printed matter doctrine is not applicable to
computer programs in a tangible medium); In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583
(Fed. Cir. 1994) ("A 'printed matter rejection' under § 103 stands on
questionable legal and logical footing. Standing alone, the description of an
element of the invention as printed matter tells nothing about the differences
between the invention and the prior art or about whether that invention was
suggested by the prior art.... [The CCPA], notably weary of reiterating this
point, clearly stated that printed matter may well constitute structural limitations
upon which patentability can be predicated.") (quoting In re Gulack, 703 F.2d
1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
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was ill-defined, and most cases applying it failed to explain its
rationale.9 2 The business methods exception did, however, play a
role as a gatekeeper to exclude information and abstractions from
patent protection, until the Federal Circuit sounded its death knell
in State Street."
Examination of early and modem business methods cases
suggests that these cases pertained to attempts to capture business
concepts and ideas per se, and not their practical applications. The
general notion that methods of doing business are not patentable
subject matter can be found in some late nineteenth century and
early twentieth century decisions.94 However, some scholars have
managed to show that business concepts were protected under
domestic patent law during the early days of the patent system."
The prevalent view is that the business method exception can
be traced back to Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.96
Finding the invention at issue in the case obvious, the court stated
that "[a] system of transacting business disconnected from the
means for carrying out the system is not . . . an art."97 It is this
92 See Samuelson, supra note 71, at 1054 n.25 (suggesting two rationales
for the exception: first, improved business methods are not contributions to the
"useful arts;" second, there has not been a need for patent incentives to bring
about an appropriate level of innovation in business).
9 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
94 See, e.g., Munson v. City of New York, 124 U.S. 601, 604 (1888) (doubting
whether a method for the filing and canceling of bonds, coupons, and stock
certificates to prevent fraud constituted patentable subject matter, questioning
whether "upon the face of the specification [it] could be considered as an 'art,
machine, or composition of matter,' within the meaning of the patent laws");
U.S. Credit Sys. Co. v. Am. Credit Indem. Co., 59 F. 139 (2d Cir. 1893)
(invalidating a patent claim for a means of insuring businesses against bad debts
for lack of novelty).
9 Michael Risch, America's First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1320,
(2012) ("[E]arly inventors sought business methods patents. Nearly 8% of all
methods patents were business methods patents . . . ."); id. at 1327 ("[T]here are
a sufficient number of patents relating to non-manufacturing methods,
describing both business methods and non-business methods, to infer that early
patentees did not believe that patents were limited to 'mechanical arts' or
'technological arts,' as some have argued the term 'useful arts' means.").
96 See Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
97 Id. at 469 (emphasis added).
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statement that led lower courts and the USPTO to regard the
decision as reflecting the settled law on the unpatentability of
"business plans and systems.""
The "mixture" of computer technology with business concepts
and ideas in the 1960s and 1970s created confusion and
inconsistency in the way courts analyzed business method patents
when such patents were challenged. Because the doctrine was
ill-defined, courts were more responsive to the combination of
information technologies and business concepts, and consequently
went to extraordinary lengths to find such patents valid, eventually
leading to the doctrine's demise.99
Federal Circuit decisions continued to recognize the relevance
of the business method exception, but it was not directly
implemented.'oo However, as part of a more general process that
patent law is undergoing, 0 ' the CCPA and its successor, the
Federal Circuit, contributed to the erosion of abstraction
98 See also Lowe's Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d
547, 551 (1st Cir. 1949) (prefacing its finding of a patent claim for a system of
parking cars in an open lot unpatentable by stating that "it is elementary that
however new and useful, or even revolutionary and beneficial to humanity an
idea may be, it is not of itself patentable" and that a system of doing business, no
matter how "novel, useful, or commercially successful is not patentable apart
from the means for making the system practically useful, or carrying it out").
But see Park-In Theatres, Inc. v. Rogers, 130 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1942) (holding
that the arrangement of cars in a drive-in theater was patentable subject matter).
99 See, e.g., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1369 (D. Del. 1983) (rejecting a
non-statutory subject matter attack on a patent claim, which was drafted in
"means" apparatus form, for a "Cash Management Account" because the claims
allegedly teach a method of operation on a computer to effectuate a business
activity," while acknowledging at the same time that "[t]he product of the claims
... effectuates a highly useful business method and would be unpatentable if
done by hand").
10' See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("We ... note that
Maucorps dealt with a business methodology for deciding how salesmen should
best handle respective customers and Meyer involved a isystemv for aiding a
neurologist in diagnosing patients. Clearly, neither of the alleged 'inventions' in
those cases falls [sic] within any i 101 category."); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835,
837 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (listing methods of doing business as among categories of
unpatentable subject matter).
1ot See discussion infra Part II.E.
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gatekeepers, affecting, inter alia, the application of the business
method exception as well.10 2 Thus, it is not surprising to find
statements from cases applying the business method exception
signaling the exception's demise. For example, Judge Newman, in
her dissent in In re Schrader,' argued that the business method
doctrine "merits retirement from the glossary of section 101."'10
She observed that the doctrine is a "fuzzy, . . . unwarranted
encumbrance to the definition of statutory subject matter in section
101"' and concluded that it should be discarded as "error-prone,
redundant, and obsolete."' 06
The opportunity to lay the exception to rest came a few years
later. In State Street,'07 the patent at issue claimed "a computerized
accounting system for managing a mutual fund investment
structure."'" The patent's specification referred to a computer
program, marketed by the patentee, for carrying out the necessary
calculations to manage a mutual fund investment structure on a
personal computer.'0 9
The district court found the patent claims invalid under Section
101 because they claimed "a mathematical algorithm [was] not
applied to or limited by physical elements or process steps.""0 The
court noted that its decision also complied with the exclusion from
subject matter patentability of business methods.'" The court's
analysis acknowledged the underlying rationale of the exception:
102 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
103 In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
'0 Id at 298 (Newman, J., dissenting).
105 id.
106id
107 927 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996).
108 Id. at 504. The system concerned a "Hub and Spoke" arrangement in
which separate mutual funds (the spokes) pooled their assets in an investment
portfolio (the hub). Id. Such an arrangement created administrative challenges
with which the patent aimed to cope, including, in particular, the daily allocation
of income, capital gains, and expenses or investment losses. Id. at 504-05. The
patent disclosed and claimed a data processing system for making the necessary
daily calculations. Id
109 Id. at 505.
'Ild at 510 (citation omitted).
Id. at 515.
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"Business methods are unpatentable abstract ideas."" 2 Applying
the exception, the court found that "the . . . Patent is claimed
sufficiently broadly to foreclose virtually any computer-
implemented accounting method necessary to manage this type of
financial structure.""' It stated further:
In effect, the . .. Patent grants [the patentee] a monopoly on its idea of
a multi-tiered partnership portfolio investment structure; patenting an
accounting system necessary to carry on a certain type of business is
tantamount to a patent on the business itself. Because such abstract
ideas are not patentable, either as methods of doing business or as
mathematical algorithms, the . . . Patent must fail."14
The Federal Circuit held that "[w]hether the claims are directed
to subject matter within § 101 should not turn on whether the
claimed subject matter does 'business' instead of something
else.""' It also explicitly decided to sound the death knell of "this
ill-conceived exception.""'
However, the Supreme Court in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C."' and LabCorp" seemed to disagree with the Federal
Circuit by signaling its uneasiness with granting business method
patents, questioning the exception's validity, and raising doubts
concerning the patentability test outlined in State Street. The
Court suggested that if the opportunity arose, it might reexamine
the validity of such patents as well as the criteria for subject matter
eligibility."' Most recently, however, in In re Bilski, both the
112 Id.
"' Id. at 516.
114 id.
" State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
116 Id. at 1375 ("Since its inception, the 'business method' exception has
merely represented the application of some general, but no longer applicable
legal principle, . . . business methods have been, and should have been, subject
to the same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process
or method.").
" 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
"' 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
" See id. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting, in an opinion joined
by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, that an "injunctive relief may have
different consequences for the burgeoning number of patents over business
methods, which were not of much economic and legal significance in earlier
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Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court reexamined the Federal
Circuit's ruling in State Street and held that business method
patents are not per se excluded from patentability, suggesting that
there is no basis for denying protection to business method
patents. 120
E. The Mathematical Algorithm Exception: Searching for a
Physicality Anchor
This section discusses the emergence of the mathematical
algorithm exception, highlighting major milestones in its
development. The mathematical algorithm exception excludes
algorithms, including algorithms that are incorporated in computer
software, which are simply a series of logical steps that achieve a
certain result. Compared to other gatekeepers, this exception
signifies the most meaningful response from courts directed at the
challenges posed by the patentability of software and new
technologies. The following discussion sheds light regarding the
analysis of abstractions' patentability by exposing the weak
rationales for excluding abstractions through the mathematical
algorithm exception.
The general expansion of patentable subject matter during the
last fifteen years is primarily attributable to the introduction of
times. The potential vagueness and suspect validity of some of these patents
may affect the calculus under the four-factor test") (emphasis added); Lab. Corp.
of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (per curiam) (noting that the Federal Circuit's decision in State
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. did not state that "a
process is patentable if it produces a 'useful, concrete, and tangible result,' " but
stressed that "this Court has never made such a statement and, if taken literally,
the statement would cover instances where this Court has held the contrary")
(citation omitted).
120 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[B]usiness method
claims (and indeed all process claims) are 'subject to the same legal
requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method.' ")
(citation omitted); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) ("Section 101
similarly precludes the broad contention that the term 'process' categorically
excludes business methods. The term 'method' which is within § 100(b)'s
definition of 'process,' at least as a textual matter and before consulting other
limitations in the Patent Act and this Court's precedents, may include at least
some methods of doing business.").
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information technologies, such as computer hardware and
software. Unlike industrial age innovations, which focused on
tangible processes and products, information technologies at times
capture innovations that are not tangible. Unsurprisingly, while
the various patent gatekeepers performed well in the old industrial
age, the advent of computer technologies forced the CCPA and
Federal Circuit to adapt their doctrines regarding computer
software patentability. The CCPA and Federal Circuit have been
largely unsuccessful in confronting the challenges of these new
technologies because they have failed to offer a workable and
coherent framework for assessing subject matter eligibility. Of all
information technologies, the introduction of computer technology
provided one of the greatest challenges to the patent system.
While computer programs were initially considered generally
unpatentable,12 ' the CCPA still upheld computer program-related
claims as long as they contained some claim language that limited
the patent scope to machine implementations of the process.'22
However, after the CCPA repudiated the mental steps doctrine
in In re Musgrave,'23 the only requirement for the patentability of a
process was that it needed to form part of the "technological
arts." 2 4
In response to In re Musgrave, which failed to provide clear
guidelines on the patentability of computer programs, the Supreme
Court issued its famous trilogy Gottschalk v. Benson,125 Parker v.
121 In 1966, the USPTO issued a set of guidelines that limited the availability
of patents for computer-related inventions. Richard A. Bachand, Patents:
Proposed Guidelines to Examination of Programs, 4 TULSA L.J. 258, 258
(1967). The guidelines generally provided that computer programs were
unpatentable. Id. at 260.
122 The USPTO guidelines created an exception, however, for a programmed
computer that was claimed as a component of a patentable process. Id. This
condition was satisfied if the computer program, which in and of itself was not
patentable, was combined with other nonobvious elements that produced a
physical result. Id. at 261.
123 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
124 Id. at 893. The CCPA's decision in In re Musgrave disrupted the status
quo ante concerning the non-patentability of mental processes, because the
CCPA's decision did not provide clear guidelines as to what excludes computer
software from patent protection.
125 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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Flook,'26 and Diamond v. Diehr,'2 7 creating a new abstractions
gatekeeper: the mathematical algorithm exception. In the trilogy
cases, the Court strongly opposed the patentability of the
inventions at issue.
In Benson, the first of the trilogy cases, the Court emphasized
the physicality of patentable processes as a precondition to
patentability and introduced the machine-or-transformation test,
providing that "[t]ransformation and reduction of an article 'to a
different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process
claim that does not include particular machines."' 2 8 The Court
noted that the claims at issue "were not limited to any particular art
or technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any
particular end use" and, moreover, that the claims "purported to
cover any use of the claimed method" for converting binary-coded
decimal numerals into pure binary numbers, using a
general-purpose computer.'29 As a result, "the patent would wholly
pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would
be a patent on the algorithm itself."' 3 0
Similarly, the majority in Flook noted that mathematical
algorithms were unpatentable because they were similar to laws of
126 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
127 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
128 Benson, 409 U.S. at 70.
129 Id. at 64.
130 Id. at 72. Throughout the decision, the Court made many statements that
implicitly suggested why it was disturbed by the information processing claimed
in the patent. Id. at 65. While describing how digital computers operate on
data, the Court stated that they "operate[] on data expressed in digits, solving a
problem by doing arithmetic as a person would do it by head and hand. Id.
Likewise, discussing the conversion of BCD to pure binary form, the Court
noted that such conversion could "be done mentally" through use of a table
printed in the text of the opinion. Id. at 67. It also pointed out that the method
"varies the ordinary arithmetic steps a human would use by changing the order
of the steps," although it also noted the method could be carried out without a
computer. Id. All of these statements suggest that, although computerized, the
method of the claim pertained to something that humans have always had access
to without the aid of a computer, suggesting implicitly that they should be able
to keep employing these "basic tools" without being hindered by property rights
bestowed upon a patentee.
181JAN. 2014]
N.C.J.L. & TECH
nature."' Nonetheless, the Court sought to avoid holding that all
mathematical algorithms and computer-related inventions are per
se unpatentable'3 2 and suggested that "it is equally clear that a
process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of
nature or a mathematical algorithm."' 3 However, the Court found
the invention at issue-a method for updating alarm limits with
regard to catalytic conversion-unpatentable.'3 4 Interestingly, the
Court reached this conclusion even though patenting the invention
would not have precluded every possible use of the algorithm and
despite the fact that the claims also included the step of adjusting
the alarm value to the updated number calculated by use of the
algorithm. The Court explained that the latter post-solution step
was essentially "conventional or obvious," and that the patent
claim would effectively cover the algorithm itself.'35
The Supreme Court's decision in Benson was heavily
criticized."' The absence of additional guidance concerning a
'' Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978). But see Chisum, supra note 71,
at 959 (suggesting that Benson was wrongly decided and arguing that the Court
failed to offer any viable policy justification for excluding by judicial fiat
mathematical algorithms).
13 Flook, 437 U.S. at 595 ("Neither the dearth of precedent, nor this decision,
should therefore be interpreted as reflecting a judgment that patent protection of
certain novel and useful computer programs will not promote the progress of
science and the useful arts, or that such protection is undesirable as a matter of
policy. Difficult questions of policy concerning the kinds of programs that may
be appropriate for patent protection and the form and duration of such protection
can be answered by Congress on the basis of current empirical data not equally
available to this tribunal.").
"' Id. at 590.
134 Id. at 600.
'1 Id. at 590.
136 See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 7171, (arguing that algorithms should be the
subject of patent protection if the patent law standards of novelty and
unobviousness are met.); Irah H. Donner & J. Randall Beckers, Throwing Out
Baby Benson with the Bath Water: Proposing a New Test for Determining
Statutory Subject Matter, 33 JURIMETRICS J. 247, 254 (1993) (suggesting that it
is time to sound the death knell of Benson: "Since the courts, including the
Supreme Court, and commentators have been unable to make sense of the past,
we propose that it is time to throw out the baby with the bath water. That is, we
now attempt a new approach for use in determining statutory subject matter as
described below."); Lee A. Hollaar, Justice Douglas Was Right: The Need for
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number of major aspects of the decision led courts to refrain from
adhering entirely to the new exception, instead exhibiting a
willingness to retain some elements whilst ignoring others.' The
dominant approach as reflected by the CCPA's decisions was to
narrowly read the Benson requirements. This narrow interpretation,
along with the prohibition to wholly preempt mathematical
algorithms, opened the door to the patentability of algorithms.'
Furthermore, courts had adopted different rules and approaches
in their attempts to follow the Benson decision. The CCPA
elevated the form of claims over their substance, finding claims
Congressional Action on Software Patents, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 283, 297-304 (1996)
(suggesting to adopt Justice Douglas' approach in Benson and adopting a
legislation which protects software by following 3 steps: clarifying that
computer-implemented processes are patentable, excluding information stored in
obvious ways in determining novelty, and protecting those holding patents on
methods from those who distribute computer programs implementing those
methods.); Samuelson, supra note 71, at 102 (suggesting there is a basis in
patent law for denying patents to computer program algorithms and to a number
of other computer program-related innovations).
'n See Chisum, supra note 71, at 992 ("The development of the law
after Benson as to the patentability of processes that involve computation or the
use of mathematical concepts follows a path of confusion and arbitrary
distinctions. All of the difficulties in achieving rationality and predictability can
be traced back to the ambiguous and poorly-supported holding in Benson on the
nonpatentability of algorithms.").
138 Id. See, e.g., In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1246 (C.C.P.A. 1978),
abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that a claim
did not recite "mathematical algorithm" because it simply recited a series of
steps determining spatial relationships of symbols not dependent on their
mathematical meaning). As for the "whole preemption" limitation, see In re
Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 156 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (holding that Benson precluded
patents only where the claims if granted "would have preempted all practical use
of both the underlying mathematical formula and the involved algorithm"); In re
Noll, 545 F.2d 141, 148 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (distinguishing Benson on the ground
that Noll's claims were limited to a particular technology (computer graphics
systems and scan-conversion of graphic information)); see also In re Waldbaum,
559 F.2d 611, 617 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (rejecting the argument that because the
applicant limited the scope of some of his claims to data processing applications
and some to telephone service applications, they were patentable because a
patent on these claims "would, in practical effect, be a patent on the algorithm
itself-albeit in its limited, specific application to calculating the number of busy
and idle lines in a telephone system") (emphasis omitted).
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that recited a machine to be patentable, even if substantively the
claims recited an algorithm.'
In response to the narrow interpretation of Benson, the CCPA
and the Supreme Court in Flook introduced and embraced,
respectively, the "point of novelty" test, which provided that if an
algorithm was the only element that distinguished a process from
the prior art, the claim would be considered limited to the
algorithm and consequently unpatentable.'4 0 The courts thereby
reinforced the applicability of the exception by finding that the
addition of conventional post-solution steps did not convert
algorithms into patentable subject matter.14 ' Additionally, the
courts reintroduced and reemphasized tangibility as the touchstone
for the patentability of processes.'42 Lastly, the CCPA introduced
139 See, e.g., Dann v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (finding a machine claim
for an automatic financial record-keeping system employing digital computer
patentable); In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 812-13 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (reversing a
rejection of a claim drawn in apparatus form to what seemed to be a new data
structure for a micro program function, concluding that the claims were for a
new machine, a combination of "hardware elements, one of which happens to be
a portion of the computer's control store microprogrammed in a particular
manner"). But see Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1247 (expressing concern over evasive
claim drafting); In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1977)
(expressing concern over evasive claim drafting).
o See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 590, 592 (holding that while a process
containing as one of its steps an unpatentable "law of nature or a mathematical
algorithm" is not for that reason alone unpatentable, the unpatentable step must
be considered "as though it were a familiar part of the prior arts and "well
known"); In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (finding data
gathering steps old in the art and that the "point of novelty" lay in applicant's
discovery of a new mathematical formula). Of course, such an assumption
regarding the novelty of the algorithm is unjustified because it is baseless and
signifies a far-reaching attempt to preclude patenting of algorithms. A few years
later, however, the CCPA discarded the "point of novelty" test. See In re Diehr,
602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
141 See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 589-90 (finding that neither the existence of
uses of the formula at issue in the case outside the petrochemical industry nor
the presence of specific "post-solution activity" could render the claim
patentable).
142 There are many manifestations of such a trend in courts' decisions. Some
cases explained that the holding in Benson expressed the ancient rule that
"practical" application remains the key to patent protection. See, e.g., In re de
Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 1243 (C.C.P.A. 1977) ("It is thus clear that the
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the Walter-Freeman-Abele test, which provided that if an
algorithm was applied "in a specific manner to define structural
relationships between the physical elements" of an apparatus, or
was applied in a specific manner to refine process claim steps, then
it was possibly patentable. 4 3
The 1980s represent a major turning point regarding subject
matter eligibility generally and, in particular, the accommodation
of computer software and mathematical algorithms. In 1980, the
Supreme Court, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,'" signaled a broader
scope of patentable subject matter, only limiting that the invention
claimed be made by man.'4 5 The Court decided that a claim on
bacterium to which naturally occurring plasmids were added,
thereby allowing the bacterium to break down crude oil, was
patentable.'46  Because Chakrabarty invented a "nonnaturally
occurring manufacture or composition,"'47 specifically "a new
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found
in nature," the Court found the invention patentable.'4 8 More
importantly, the Court adopted a very broad approach concerning
patentable subject matter, reiterating that "Congress intended
'nutshell' language of Benson, expressed the ancient rule that practical
application remains the key."). Other courts explicitly stated that "inventions
which Congress is constitutionally empowered to make patentable are tangible
embodiments of ideas in the useful, or technological, arts." In re Sarkar, 588
F.2d 1330, 1333 (C.C.P.A. 1979). One of the clearest statements concerning
tangibility in some cases can be found in the renewed emphasis on the Benson
physical transformation test for process's patentability or the industrial character
of the claims. See, e.g., In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 768 (C.C.P.A. 1980) ("If . . .
the claimed invention produces a physical thing, . . . the fact that it is represented
in numerical form does not render the claim nonstatutory."); Diehr, 602 F.2d at
988 (reversing a rejection of claims to a method of operating a molding process
to manufacture rubber articles with a perfect cure because "[t]hey recite a
process involving the manipulation of apparatus resulting in the chemical and
physical change of starting material, the time that the mold remains closed being
controlled by a series of calculations using a recited formula").
143 Walter, 618 F.2d at 767.
144 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
145 Id. at 305.
146 Id. at 305-06.
147 Id. at 309.
I48 Id. at 310.
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statutory subject matter to include anything under the sun that is
made by man."l49
The following year, the Supreme Court pursued the same path
in Diamond v. Diehr,'o finding a process for curing rubber to be
patentable.'"' The process used a computer to repeatedly calculate
an algorithm, the Arrhenius equation, which was a well-known
method for determining the appropriate cure time of rubber.'5 2
Relying on Cochrane v. Deener,'" the Court reemphasized process
tangibility, defining a process as "an act, or a series of acts,
performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced
to a different state or thing."' 54 In other words, it reintroduced the
Benson physicality test, which required that a patentable process be
tied either to a particular machine or device or transform an article
into a different state or thing.' The Court reasoned that the
invention was not rendered unpatentable simply because several of
its steps employed a mathematical equation and a computer,
suggesting that those claims did not preempt all uses of the
mathematical algorithm.' However, the Court emphasized, as it
did in Flook, that mathematical principles by themselves were not
patentable.'
Diehr signaled the end of the "point of novelty" test, which
maintained that an invention could not be found unpatentable
simply because all the steps other than the use of the computer
149 Id. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"0 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
151 Id. at 184.
152 Id. at 177.
. 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
154 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 183 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 See id. at 184. The Court suggested that, in exploring patentability, one
had to look at whether the "whole" invention-the sum of the individual steps-
accomplished some physical feat or was accomplished in a physical manner. Id.
at 188.
"s6 Id. at 191-92.
15 Id. ("[I]nsignificant post-solution activity will not transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process."). The Court distinguished its
decision in Parker v. Flook, suggesting that Flook's claims for computing alarm
limit for any catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons were also not valid because
they contained merely "token postsolution activity." Id. at 192 n.14. It seems
that the Court viewed the claims as too vague and too broad.
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were known in the art.' For a number of years following Diehr,
the Federal Circuit declined to decide the patentability of
computer-related inventions;' this was due to the USPTO's policy
and practice of no longer resisting the issuance of patents for
computer-related inventions.' 60
However, at some point following Diehr, the Federal Circuit
struggled to interpret the standards announced in Diehr with
respect to computer-related inventions.'6 ' In Arrhythmia Research
Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.,'62 the Federal Circuit
stretched the meaning of the physicality requirement by suggesting
that the requirement could easily be satisfied not only by finding
physical elements in the claims themselves or in their actual
results, but alternatively by having physical representations.'6 3 The
invention at issue was a method for measuring and analyzing EKG
signals.164 The Federal Circuit suggested that the invention had
adequate physicality because the EKG signals were physical
phenomena representing heart activity.'6 5 Additionally, the patent
claimed a machine as performing the process, thereby
accomplishing the process of the invention through physical
means.'6 6 This claim drafting tool had been recognized as the "new
machine" doctrine.167 The Federal Circuit's artificial introduction
of a machine was aimed at introducing a physical element that
would provide adequate limitation to patent scope.
Sitting en banc, in In re Alappat,16 8 the Federal Circuit crafted a
new, broad test for subject matter eligibility regarding
" See id
159 Samuelson, supra note 71, at 1092.
16Id. at 1093.
161 See Chisum, supra note 71, at 1001.
162 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
163 Id. at 1059 ("The electrocardiograph signals are first transformed from
analog form, in which they are obtained, to the corresponding digital signal.
These input signals are not abstractions; they are related to the patient's heart
function.").
' Id at 1054.
165 See id. at 1060.
166 See id. at 1055.
67 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
168 d
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computer-related inventions by suggesting that an invention was
patentable as long as it generated a "useful, concrete, and tangible
result."'6 These eligibility requirements would be met by claiming
a computer-related activity as a "machine" performing a process.'
It also significantly limited the importance and applicability of the
algorithm exception.
After Alappat, the USPTO issued new Examination Guidelines
for Computer-Related Inventions ("USPTO Guidelines") in 1996
to provide examiners with guidance pertaining to subject matter
eligibility of such inventions."' The USPTO Guidelines were
169 Id. at 1544. In Alappat, the inventor developed a machine that was
programmed to run an algorithm that would improve the electronic waveform
displayed on a digital oscilloscope. Id. at 1537. The USPTO rejected the claim,
finding that an invention claiming a computer programmed to perform a series
of calculations and output data was not distinguishable from a mathematical
algorithm, which is unpatentable. Id. at 1539. The Federal Circuit, however,
reversed this decision, reasoning that Alappat's invention was a patentable
invention because it was a "machine," which is a Section 101 patentable
category. Id. at 1545. The Federal Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Diamond v. Chakarbarty, suggesting that Congress intended Section
101 to protect any useful and new machine, manufacture, process, or
composition of matter that met the Patent Act statutory requirements. Id. at
1542. The Federal Circuit viewed the Supreme Court's decisions regarding
computer-related inventions as supporting the restrictive view that "certain types
of mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than
abstract ideas until reduced to some type of practical application." Id. at 1543.
The court suggested that the analysis should explore whether the claim
incorporates patentable subject matter and not whether it includes elements that
when viewed separately would be unpatentable. Id. Viewed in this light, the
court held that Alappat's claims recited a specific machine that produced a
"useful, concrete, and tangible result" rather than a "disembodied mathematical
concept." Id. at 1544.
1o The Federal Circuit's decision Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir.
1992), marks the beginning of the erosion of different information gatekeepers.
Note, however, that one exceptional Federal Circuit decision issued in 1994, In
re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994), seems to go against the court's
decision in In re Alappat and its progeny. In Schrader, the court found a
method for competitively bidding on a plurality of related items employing
algorithms unpatentable subject matter. Id. at 294. The court seemed to
broaden the "mathematical algorithm" exception, providing that it encompassed
also non-numerical algorithms. See id. It also refocused processes'
patentability on physical transformation. Id. at 295.
1' See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed.
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amended in 2005 and constitute an integral part of the Manual of
Patent Examining and Procedure as part of the Interim Guidelines
for Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility ("Amended Guidelines"). 7 2 The Amended Guidelines
comply with Alappat, and take an expansive view of software
patentability.' Accordingly, the test for subject matter eligibility
set forth in the Amended Guidelines is whether the invention
produces a "useful, concrete, and tangible result."' 74
The Federal Circuit interpreted Diehr broadly in its decisions
in State Street"' and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.176
As discussed above, State Street concerned a patent claiming a
data processing system for administering mutual funds.'77  The
Federal Circuit found the claim patentable.7 7 The court held that
"to be patentable an algorithm must be applied in a 'useful'
way," 79 interpreting the Supreme Court trilogy (Benson, Flook,
and Diehr) to provide "that mathematical algorithms are not
patentable subject matter to the extent they are merely abstract
ideas."' Importantly, the court held that "the transformation of
data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a
series of mathematical calculations into a final share price""'
constituted a "practical application of a mathematical algorithm,
formula, or calculation, because it produces a 'useful, concrete,
and tangible result'-a final share price momentarily fixed for
Reg. 7478 (Feb. 28, 1996).
172 See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure § 2106 (8th ed., rev. 9 2012).
73 See Steven M. Greenberg, The Inconsistent Treatment of Computer
Software as Patentable Subject Matter, II J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 77, 86 (2006).
174 Id. at 78.
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
176 AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999),
abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370; see also State St. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D. Mass. 1996).
178 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370.
17 9 Id. at 1373.
8 o Id.
'' Id
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recording and reporting purposes."l82 As a result, "[t]he question
of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter should
not focus on which of the four categories a claim is directed to ...
but rather on the essential characteristic of the subject matter, in
particular, its practical utility.""'
One year later, the court extended State Street in Excel
Communications by upholding the patentability of a process for
generating a message record for interchangeable telephone calls.'84
Although the end result of the process was the creation of a "signal
useful for billing purposes," the court rejected the argument that
Diehr stood for the proposition that process claims containing
algorithms were patentable "only if there is a 'physical
transformation' or conversion of subject matter from one state into
another.""' According to the court, physical transformation "is not
an invariable requirement, but merely one example of how a
mathematical algorithm may bring about a useful application."' 86
The only requirement was that the process containing the
algorithm "produces a tangible, useful, result." 8 1 State Street
reflected the Federal Circuit's realization that subject matter
eligibility thresholds, including the physical anchor requirement,
were nonsensical in the new information age. It is, therefore, not
surprising that rather than introducing a strict test for patentability,
the court introduced a broad and flexible test, ruling that an
invention was patentable as long as it produced a "useful, concrete,
and tangible" result.' Arguably, in introducing this new test, the
court did not abandon the physicality requirement because it
182 d
' Id. at 1375.
184 AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
1999), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
15Id. at 1358.
186 d.
'17 Id. at 1360-61.
188 Id. at 1360. But see Thomas R. Makin, Hotel Checking: You Can Check
Out Any Time You Want, But Can You Ever Leave? The Patenting of Business
Methods, 24 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 93, 112 (2001) (critiquing State Street for
offering a "toothless test to analyze business method patents," effectively failing
"to impose any such meaningful limitation on the business method patent
free-for-all").
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required that the result be tangible.'" However, a closer reading of
the case's facts suggests that tangibility does not stand for
physicality but rather for something else.'" The court found that
the numbers that were generated using the invention at issue,
which simply represented dollar figures, constituted a "tangible"
result. This clearly suggests that the test's tangibility requirement
did not necessarily require physicality, but was probably a proxy
for addressing the court's concern in preventing overreaching,
broad patents.'"' Therefore, under State Street, an invention,
including an algorithm's application, does not need to satisfy any
physicality requirement as long as it was useful and concrete.
Despite these developments regarding the patentability of
computer-related inventions and their applicability to business
methods, the USPTO, until recently, relied on In re Musgrave in its
i8 Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d at 1360.
190 The Federal Circuit's decision in State Street and ensuing rulings were
criticized on many grounds. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal
Professions, 40 B.C. L. REv. 1139, 1140-42 (1999) (arguing that the decision
expands eligibility to the liberal arts and hence, undermines the constitutionally
mandated requirement to grant patents only to advances in the "useful arts.");
see also Kevin Michael Lemley, Just Turn North on State Street and Then
Follow the Signs Given by the Federal Circuit: A Sophisticated Approach to the
Patentability of Computerized Business Methods, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 4-5
(2003) (stating that the decision focuses on the utility of the invention's end
result as part of the subject matter eligibility inquiry, when traditionally, such
inquiry was reserved to a later stage, and arguing that the decision suggests that
tangibility of the end result is required, failing to explain why it introduces such
a requirement in the first place and failing to explore where the State Street's
invention tangibility lies, when what was produced was a final share price). The
chief criticism was that the court's subject matter eligibility test was, at best,
vague and unclear, creating uncertainty as to its scope and applicability. See,
e.g., Ex parte Burnhouse, No. 2007-0345, 2007 WL 1291416, at *13 (B.P.A.I.
May 2, 2007) (finding some claims of a method of indicating actions to be taken
for selected programs listed in an electronic programming guide unpatentable,
inter alia, for failure to recite statutory subject matter, holding that "[o]ur
understanding of the current precedents is: Any computer program claimed as a
machine implementing the program (Alappat, State Street) or as a method of a
machine implementing the program (AT&T), is patentable if it transforms data
and achieves a useful, concrete and tangible result (State Street, AT&T).
Exceptions occur when the invention in actuality preempts an abstract idea, as in
a mathematical algorithm").
'9' See Burnhouse, 2007 WL 1291416, at *13.
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USPTO Guidelines, suggesting that "[o]nly when the claim is
devoid of any limitation to a practical application in the
technological arts should it be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101."9192
The USPTO Guidelines did not define the term "technological
arts." However, as already discussed, many patents issued during
the 1990s and early 2000s appear to bear little relationship to what
most people would consider "technology.""' Capturing abstractions
per se through patents is one clear example of this trend.
One of the most anticipated decisions in the law of patent
eligibility in recent years was the Supreme Court's approach in
Laboratory Corp. ofAmerica Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories,
Inc. ("LabCorp").'94 The inventors discovered a naturally occurring
correlation between deficiencies of folate and cobalamin and the
level of the amino acid homocysteine.'" They obtained a patent
which claimed, inter alia, a method for diagnosing a folate or
cobalamin deficiency in humans. This method was comprised of
(1) testing for the presence of an elevated level of homocysteine
and (2) correlating an elevated level of homocysteine with a folate
and cobalamin deficiency.'96
The Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief
stating the U.S. Government's views on whether the patent claim
at issue was invalid by reason of the rule that laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas were unpatentable.'9 '
Nonetheless, the Court decided to dismiss the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.' In his dissent, Justice Breyer, with whom
Justices Souter and Stevens concurred, argued against dismissing
the writ, despite the fact that LabCorp had not raised the law of
nature exclusion at the district court and the Federal Circuit had
not discussed the issue at all.' 99 Although Justice Breyer did not
192 MPEP § 2106 (8th ed., Rev. 3, Aug. 2005).
193 Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d at 1358.
194 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125
(2006) (per curiam).
'9 Id. at 128 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 129.
19 7 Id. at 132.
198 Id. at 125 (per curiam).
' Id. at 131 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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explicitly express any views regarding the question whether
patentable processes require physical transformation of matter,200
he noted that the claim at issue did not involve any physical
transformation.2 0' Justice Breyer also questioned State Street's
patent eligibility test that suggested that processes were patentable
as long as they produced a "useful, concrete, and tangible result." 202
The dissenting Justices' statements in LabCorp forced the Federal
Circuit to reconsider its State Street test. Soon after LabCorp was
decided, the Federal Circuit encountered a number of additional
cases in which it was able to do so. Indeed, in In re Comiskey,20 3 In
re Nuiften,2 04 and In re Bilski,205 the Federal Circuit essentially
repudiated the patentability test announced in State Street and
replaced it with Diehr's "machine-or-transformation" test.206
In In re Bilski, Claim 1 of the patent application claimed a
three-step method for a broker to hedge risks for purchaser-users of
an input of a product or service (termed a commodity). 207 The
Federal Circuit held that Claim 1 was directed to abstract ideas and
as such was unpatentable. 20 8 Although the court reverted to the
machine-or-transformation test, it suggested that physicality was
only a proxy and that a patentable article could either be a physical
thing or "representative" of physical things-which the court
defined mostly by exclusion. 209  For example, mere "legal
obligations," "business risks," or "other abstractions" would not
qualify.210 The court's rationale for these exclusions was that they
better prevented overarching, broad patent claims. 2 1' Although
200 Id. at 136.
201 Id
202 id
203 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007), opinion withdrawn and superseded on
reh'g en banc, 2006-1286, 2009 WL 68845 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13, 2009), opinion
revised and superseded, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
204 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
205 re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
206 Id. at 961-62.
207Id. at 949.
208 Id. at 965-66.
209 Id. at 963.
210 ida
211 Id. at 962. The court also emphasized both that "mere field of use
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agreeing with the majority's holding, Judge Rader's dissent in In
re Bilski suggested that the machine-or-transformation test was
nonsensical if "raw materials ... of information-age processes are
electronic signals and electronically-manipulated data."212 Judge
Rader suggested that the test left many questions unanswered, was
suitable for the industrial age but not the information age, and that
its focus should be upon the three exclusions to patentability.2 13
The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's rejection of
Bilski's patent application. 2 14  However, in a complex decision
delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court rejected the machine-or-
transformation test established by the Federal Circuit as the
exclusive test for patent eligibility on the basis that it read
unexpressed limitations into the language of the Patent Act.2 15 The
Court also held that business method patents were not to be
categorically excluded.216 In reaching its holding, the Court relied
on Section 273 of the Patent Act,2 17 and focused on the claims at
issue as constituting abstract ideas with only insignificant
post-solution activity, citing Benson, Flook, and Diehr.2 18
limitations" were insufficient to limit the scope of claims and that
"insignificant" extra-solution activity was also insufficient to meet the test's
machine-or-transformation prongs. Id. at 957 n.2. Additionally, the court
emphasized that claims "must impose meaningful limits," suggesting that mere
manipulation of information and "abstract constructs such as legal obligations,
organizational relationships, and business risks" did not meet the test's
transformation prong. Id. at 962. However, the court suggested that
"transformation of ... raw data into a particular visual depiction of a physical
object is enough." Id. at 963.
212 Id. at 1013 (Rader, J., dissenting); see also Robert Plotkin, Computer
Programming and the Automation of Invention: A Case for Software Patent
Reform, 2003 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 7, 99 ("Patent law's emphasis on physical
structure made sense, and continues to make sense, in the context of
electromechanical devices that must be designed and described in terms of their
physical structure to enable the public to make and use them. Software
programs, however, need not be designed nor described in terms of their
physical structure to enable the public to make and use them.").
213 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1014 (Rader, J., dissenting).
214 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010).
215 Id. at 3227, 3231.
216 Id. at 3228.
217 Id.
21 8Id. at 3230.
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The Court agreed with Judge Rader's observation in his dissent
in Bilski219 that the machine-or-transformation test or the business
method exclusion might have made sense in relation to "industrial
age" technologies but that they were no longer pertinent to new
"information age" technologies. The Court, therefore, suggested
that the subject matter provisions of the Patent Act needed to be
construed in a dynamic fashion to remain relevant.2 2 0 The Court
rightly suggested that the machine-or-transformation test would
create uncertainty as to the patentability of software, advanced
diagnostic methods, inventions based on linear programming, data
compression, and the manipulation of digital signals. 221
In addition to the Court's rejection of the machine-or-
transformation test as the sole test for patentability, the Court also
rejected the State Street test for patentable subject matter,
suggesting that it was too broad. The Court concluded that the
concept of hedging that was described above222 in Claim 1 and
additional claims of the patent at issue was an unpatentable
abstract idea.223
219 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1013-14 (Rader, J., dissenting).
220 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228. But see Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean
Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 855 (2007) (arguing
that a Burkean-inspired approach to patent law-one that respects tradition and
that generally prefers gradual to radical change-suggests that we consider again
some traditional, but now dormant, restraints on patentable subject matter that
may have embodied a degree of wisdom. Specifically, some of the traditional
limitations on patentable subject matter, as embodied in the technological arts,
mental steps, and physical transformation doctrines, may yet have much to
recommend them and should be reintroduced in a reformed way into the patent
system); Jay Dratler, Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software
and Business-Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 823 (2003) (arguing
that state-granted monopolies for minor "innovations" without technological
risks, such as business methods, will have a corrosive effect that may take
decades or centuries to emerge and suggesting that courts re-open the safety
valves of the subject matter exceptions and introduce a more robust test for
obviousness that may require discriminating judgments and increase the
uncertainty of patent litigation).
221 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
222 See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962-63.
223 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
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F. Post-Bilski Criticism and New Approaches
Overall, the Supreme Court's decision in Bilski has sparked an
ongoing debate regarding subject matter eligibility thresholds.
Although there seems to be a consensus among scholars and courts
that Bilski created vagueness and uncertainty regarding subject
matter eligibility thresholds, debate remains regarding how to best
address these issues.224
Although the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court reintroduced
stringent subject matter eligibility thresholds in Bilski, the Federal
Circuit has taken a variety of approaches towards subject matter
eligibility post-Bilski. Some judges, such as Newman and Plager,
suggest that courts should simply avoid the metaphysical question
of whether an invention is unpatentably abstract and instead focus
on the conditions of patentability found in Sections 102, 103, and
112 of the Patent Act.225 This, they suggest, "would make patent
litigation more efficient, conserve judicial resources, and bring a
degree of certainty to the interests of both patentees and their
competitors in the marketplace." 226
224 See, e.g., Matthew DeLulio, Courts Left with Little Guidance Following
the Supreme Court's Decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 285 (2010); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski back to
Benson: Preemption, Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63
STAN. L. REV. 1349 (2011); Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the
Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski's Superficial Textualism
and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring,
63 STAN. L. REv. 1289 (2011); Paul E. Schaafsma, The Case for Financial
Product Patents: What the Supreme Court Got Right and Wrong in Bilski v.
Kappos, and a Suggestion for a Reasonable Line on Business Method Patents,
92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 398 (2010).
225 See MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1260 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (finding courts should "insist that litigants initially address patent
invalidity issues in terms of conditions of patentability defenses as the statute
provides, specifically §§ 102, 103, and 112."); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v.
Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1066-67 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (applying Bilski, Judge
Newman reiterated that Section 101 inquiries should avoid barring at the
threshold and should instead preserve legal and practical distinctions between
the threshold Section 101 inquiry and the substantive conditions for
patentability).
226 MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1250.
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Other judges on the Federal Circuit argue that subject matter
eligibility questions should be addressed, suggesting that the
statute "is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not
be ignored."22 7 Therefore, "a robust application of section 101 [sic]
is required to ensure that the patent laws comport with their
constitutionally defined objective."228
Some judges have suggested that Bilski advises against the use
of any rigid rules in the Patent Act,229 while others note that Bilski
cautioned against applying limitations and conditions to patent law
that were not expressed by the legislature, including categorical
exclusions.2 30 It is, therefore, unclear which test will be eventually
227 Id. at 1269 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
228 Id.
229 Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(acknowledging that the machine-or-transformation test remains "simply a
useful and important clue, an investigative tool" used to analyze abstracted
processes under Section 101, and is perhaps better suited for Industrial Age
processes as opposed to inventions in the Information Age); Arlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Lourie,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating the problem in claim
interpretation is the focus on "muddy, conflicting, and overly formulaic rules.");
Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (suggesting that Bilski did not presume to provide a rigid formula or
definition of abstractness and reemphasized the significance of a broad statutory
reading of Section 101); Cancer Research Tech. Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 625
F.3d 724, 734-38 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Prost, C.J., dissenting) (citing Bilski as
standing for the Supreme Court's warning away of excessive formalities in
patent laws), petition for reh'g denied, 637 F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (suggesting that per Bilski, while the machine-or-transformation test
remains an important clue, failing it is not dispositive); King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon
Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that Bilski
makes clear that there is no exclusive inquiry under Section 101); Prometheus
Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Serv., 628 F.3d 1347, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (suggesting that Bilski only rejected the exclusive nature of the
machine-or-transformation test and regarded the test as merely a "useful and
important clue, an investigative tool" that often leads to a clear and compelling
conclusion as to Section 101 subject matter).
230 Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(suggesting that Bilski stands for a broad statutory reading as to eligible subject
matter); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1353 (Fed.
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adopted for the purpose of exploring eligibility thresholds, as well
as how the courts will handle abstract innovation.
Justice Stevens's overview in Bilski shows that searching for
physical anchors in claims primarily served as both a means for
excluding abstractions and also as a proxy for concerns felt by
some courts regarding patenting abstractions.2 31 As shown by
Michael Risch, most of the significant cases pertaining to subject
matter eligibility involved claims excluded from patent protection
because of criteria other than subject matter eligibility.232 Further,
Professors Merges and Crouch have recently proposed that rather
than try to handle the complexity of Bilski's subject matter
eligibility thresholds, the thresholds should be avoided by limiting
reference to Section 101 only if absolutely necessary to determine
the validity of a claim.233 Instead of applying Section 101, Merges
Cir. 2011); see also Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317,
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Dealertrack as a source to interpret and apply
Bilski).
231 See Makin, supra note 188, at 103 (explaining the abstractness test and the
physicality/transformation touchstone, suggesting that they are simply a proxy
for protecting the public domain from over-expansive business method
patenting).
232 Risch, supra note 622, at 640-41; see also Erik S. Maurer, An Economic
Justification for a Broad Interpretation of Patentable Subject Matter, 95 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1057, 1096 (2001) ("[W]here the marketplace is allowed to select what
subject matters of invention should be patented, the requirements of novelty,
utility, and non-obviousness protect society's existing store of knowledge
against monopoly with minimally intrusive legal intervention."); Eugene R.
Quinn, Jr., The Proliferation of Electronic Commerce Patents: Don't Blame the
PTO, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 121, 153 (2002) ("[S]tatutorily-
created or judicially-created exceptions to patentability are not wise, particularly
when there are other alternatives that would be just as effective."); John A.
Squires & Thomas S. Biemer, Patent Law 101: Does a Grudging Lundgren
Panel Decision Mean that the USPTO Is Finally Getting the Statutory Subject
Matter Question Right?, 46 IDEA 561, 585-86 (2006) (supporting the decision
in Ex Parte Lundgren and suggesting that we should move away from subject
matter eligibility inquiries and focus instead on novelty and obviousness
analysis).
233 Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by
Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673,
1674 (2010); see also Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman & R.
Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1331 (2011) (arguing
that perceiving Section 101 as a gatekeeper is wrong and suggesting that the
[VOL. 15: 153198
Patenting Abstractions
and Crouch suggest that any claim could be invalidated under one
of the less controversial and less complex requirements for
patentability-Sections 102, 103, and 112.234 Like Professor
Risch, they support this conclusion based upon a set of empirical
data that indicates that the "vast majority of patent claims
challenged on subject matter eligibility were also challenged on
other grounds." 23 5
While it is an appealing approach, eliminating subject matter
eligibility thresholds would be an illogical measure, as these
thresholds serve an important role in weeding out many
undeserving inventions without engaging in a full examination of
the patent application."' Additionally, the requirement to engage
in a subject matter eligibility inquiry is constitutionally mandated
and therefore cannot be avoided. 237  Furthermore, others counter
that the eligibility thresholds are justified on many grounds and
should be preserved by further refinement of the eligibility tests in
order to maintain a robust public domain.23 8
abstract idea exception should be reconceived as a scope limitation so that
downstream innovation will not be threatened); Daniel J. Klein, The Integrity of
Section 101-A "New and Useful" Test for Patentable Subject Matter, 93 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 287, 291 (2011) (suggesting a patentability test
based on the language "new and useful" of Section 101 of the Patent Act so as to
avoid the use of extra-statutory categorical exclusions).
234 Crouch & Merges, supra note 233, at 1674.
235 Id
236 See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 220, at 876.
237 See MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1264 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Mayer, J., dissenting); see also Crouch & Merges, supra note 233, at
1686 (suggesting that Section 101 inquiry can be necessary in some cases).
238 See, e.g., Menell, supra note 224, at 1314 (criticizing Bilski and arguing
that the subject matter inquiry must evolve to meet the new challenges of the
Information Age, adopting a flexible analysis which is sensitive of history,
constitutional constraints, statutory evolution, and modem technology); Stephen
Pulley, An "Exclusive" Application of an Abstract Idea: Clarification of Patent-
Eligible Subject Matter After Bilski v. Kappos, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 1223, 1225
(2010) (proposing a clearer method of evaluating abstract ideas as a tool for
interpreting Section 101 of the Patent Act rather than as an exception to it and
suggesting that as a result not all abstractions should be categorically excluded);
Joshua D. Samoff, Patent Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory,
63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 53 (2011) (suggesting that subject matter eligibility
exclusions were justified historically on both deontological and utilitarian moral
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Last, many policy rationales support excluding abstractions
from patent protection. These policy rationales are discussed in
the next Part.
IV. RATIONALES FOR EXCLUDING ABSTRACTIONS:
A FOUR-TIER FRAMEWORK
To date, most academic literature has not paid close attention
to the question of patenting abstractions. This question has never
been dealt with seriously or explicitly by the Supreme Court or
Federal Circuit, resulting in both a lack of persuasiveness and
clarity in their decisions and a negative impact on innovation in
many important fields such as computer software, diagnostic
methods, and business methods. The intention of this Part is, thus,
to identify and further explore the rationales underlying the
prohibition of patenting abstractions to promote doctrinal
coherence. The following discussion identifies four groups of
rationales found in legal scholarship and jurisprudence for
excluding abstractions: economic, constitutional law, justice-based,
and structural concerns. A discussion of the wisdom and strength
of each rationale consequently casts doubt on the notion that the
USPTO and courts automatically apply these rationales when
excluding abstractions from patent protection. Further, viewed
through this framework, this Part contends that abstractions should
not be automatically excluded. Rather, each abstract invention
requires a case-by-case analysis with a focus upon the applicability
of each set of rationales. Such a specific, case-by-case exploration
and analysis of the applicability of each set of rationales to
different types of abstract inventions will advance understanding as
to why patenting abstractions has not actually had the devastating
effects upon domestic patent law that many predicted.
As noted in Part III above, courts have introduced many
gatekeepers to patentable subject matter: the traditional exception
for abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and laws of nature; the
grounds, and that we should retain them in order to maintain a robust public
domain "suggests the high social stakes involved, the lack of theoretical or
empirical demonstration that competing innovation approaches are better, and
the moral concerns that would be raised by their elimination").
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mental steps doctrine; the printer matter rule; the business method
exception; and the mathematical algorithm exception. Each
gatekeeper addresses a different set of concerns regarding subject
matter eligibility. However, the most commonly used exception
for patentable subject matter is the rule that laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable. As shown
above, most of the other abstractions gatekeepers can easily be
captured by the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas.
Such a gross grouping between unpatentable and patentable
inventions fails to take into account the differences between laws
of nature and natural phenomena on the one hand and abstract
ideas on the other. It also fails to recognize that the universe of
abstract ideas captures many claims that are in effect very different
from each other. Therefore, rather than analyze the universe of
inventions dualistically (patentable vs. unpatentable), it is more
useful to imagine a spectrum along which abstract inventions could
be placed. The spectrum would be comprised of two ends-
patentable inventions on one end and unpatentable inventions on
the other. An abstraction's placement on this spectrum would
depend on the specific concerns arising out of each abstraction.
Because each abstraction raises different concerns and the
strengths of those concerns differ widely, it would be inaccurate to
place all abstractions on the same end of the spectrum. Rather,
abstractions should be placed somewhere along the spectrum,
offering a more accurate analysis of abstractions' patentability.
This, as a result, might lessen the strength of the objections to
patentability in some instances.
A. Economic Rationales
Various economic rationales exist concerning whether abstract
ideas should be patentable. An analysis of each economic
rationale's strengths and weaknesses demonstrates that abstract
ideas do not all raise the same economic costs as traditional
economic analysis of intellectual property law has suggested.
In their seminal work on the law and economics of patents,239
Professor Landes and Judge Posner broadly stated: "An important
239 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of
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limitation of patent law is that fundamental ideas, such as physical
laws, cannot be patented."240 There are various economic
rationales for this position. First, patenting fundamental ideas
could help create huge, stifling monopolies with little
counterbalancing benefit.24 ' Capturing abstractions, such as the
law of gravity or the concept of hedging, through patents, would
grant a large monopoly over many possible applications of these
theories, including those that the inventors themselves did not
invent.242 However, other types of abstractions do not necessarily
raise such grave concerns. For example, if the USPTO issues a
patent over a method of instructing algebra that teaches specific
steps to be taught in order to achieve certain class performance, it
is difficult to imagine how such an invention that undoubtedly
captures an abstract process as it pertains to different actions a
teacher could take in order to achieve certain teaching goals in the
classroom could lead to stifling monopolies. This abstract process
is unlike the other abstractions described above, as it is more
contextual and limited to certain circumstances-it could be
perceived as a "practical application." Although these abstract
processes are not physical, they are functional, useful, and not
merely observational or theoretical. In fact, many patent
applications over abstractions, such as those described in In re
Comiskey,243 In re Ferguson,2" and In re Bilski,245 teach abstract
processes but are nevertheless practical and useful in the real
world.
Second, patents are not the sole reward for discovering certain
kinds of abstractions or information, especially in scientific and
technological fields. Therefore, these activities are already
sufficiently incentivized and do not require additional incentives.
Intellectual Property Law (Harvard University Press, 2003).
240 Id. at 305.
241 Id. at 306.
242 Id. at 308-09.
243 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (describing a
method patent for determining and conducting arbitration).
244 In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing an
ap ?lication on how to market products).
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (describing an application
hedging risks in commodities markets).
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An exemplary incentive is the fame a person may attain for
discovering basic ideas. 246 The creation of tax strategy methods is
insightful in illustrating another type of reward; legal tax advice is
rendered on a regular basis in return for fees so that its provision
does not really require patent incentives. Additionally, many
commercial entities engage in basic research because they see how
it can be commercially applied and are consequently able to make
the connection between basic research and commercial value.247
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that some abstractions do require
incentives for their creation and dissemination. For example,
certain abstract ideas require the investment of many resources.
Thus, it is likely that in many fields, due to lack of patent
protection for abstractions, a less-than-optimal level of innovation
occurs as a result of an inability to patent certain abstract
innovations.
Third, as Landes and Posner suggested, it is difficult to
demarcate boundaries of fundamental ideas or abstractions.24 8
However, prescribing boundaries of a fundamental or abstract idea
is no more difficult than drawing the boundaries of other process
patents. Furthermore, the boundaries of abstractions depend on
how they are characterized. For example, the arguably abstract
processes at issue in In re Comiskey, 249 In re Ferguson,250 and In re
Bilski25 were specific and adequately defined to the same extent as
previously patentable processes. 25 2 Accordingly, instead of being
246 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 239, at 306-07.
247 id
248 Id. at 306.
249 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
250 In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
251 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
252 In re Comiskey states that representative Claim 1 involves a series of steps:(1) the document and its author are enrolled; (2) any challenges to the document
must be presented to the pre-chosen arbitrator; (3) the complainant submits a
request to resolve the dispute by arbitration; (4) arbitration resolution is
conducted; (5) support is provided to the arbitration; and (6) a final and binding
award or decision is determined. These steps describe a process that is arguably
tailored to a certain arbitration method, which requires the occurrence of
different steps. Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1368-69. The process is limited by the
different steps leading to the resolution of the dispute. Id. at 1369. In In re
Ferguson the patent application pertained to a marketing paradigm. Ferguson,
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regarded as vague, the court in each case could have determined
that the respective processes were patentable because they did not
resemble merely purely theoretical concepts.
Fourth, the economic risks of granting property rights in
abstractions might be enormous.25 There is a tremendous potential
for rent-seeking that would be created if property rights could be
obtained in abstractions.254 Inventors would be highly motivated to
obtain patent rights in abstractions because of the arguably broad
scope of patents that would protect abstractions. There is also
potential for enormous transaction costs that would be imposed
upon would-be users.255 The transaction costs would be large
because the scope of abstractions per se is often extremely difficult
to ascertain, such that newcomers would be unaware as to when
they must obtain a license to make use of that abstraction.25 6
Additionally, the greater the number of elements, which are owned
by individuals and out of which a new invention could be made
(i.e., the more the size of the public domain diminishes and the
more licenses are required by new users), the greater the
transaction costs that would be incurred by newcomers.2 57
558 F.3d at 1361. Claim 1 is a representative method claim that involves the
creation of a shared market force with marketing channels that allow the
marketing of a number of related products. Id The products are produced
independently, and the independent producers receive a share of the shared
marketing revenue. Id. This claim is arguably limited to a specific marketing
method. Lastly, in In re Bilski, the patent application included 11 claims for a
method for hedging risk in the commodities (or options) market. Claim I is
made of a series of steps: (1) initiating a series of transactions between the
provider and consumer where the consumer buys the commodity at a fixed rate
based on an average of historical prices, according to the consumer's risk
position; (2) identifying the commodity's market participants with a counter-
risk; (3) initiating a series of transactions between the provider and market
participants at a second fixed rate so that the risk is balanced between the market
participants and consumers. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949. These steps add context
and limit the applicability of the claim to certain circumstances rather than every
situation of risk hedging.
253 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 239, at 306.
254 Id. at 305.
255 Id. at 305-06.
256 Id. at 306.
257 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 699
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However, given the diversity of abstractions, the transaction costs
would not necessarily be high in any given case. The existence of
such costs depends on, among other factors, the nature of the
invention at issue, the field of the invention, the density of patents,
and the existence of dependency and blocking patents in each
case. 258
Fifth, the non-patentability of fundamental ideas or abstractions
is related to the observation that, at times, the costs of achieving a
discovery are less than what is needed to develop a new
invention.259 When something is arguably known and is just
"waiting to be found," the danger of a wasteful race to find it is
increased because the probability of success and expected gain is
greater.260 However, it is unclear whether discoveries are any more
or less certain than inventions. It is possible that certain
discoveries may require greater efforts compared with certain
inventions. Additionally, this analysis is not necessarily applicable
to abstractions. Laws of nature and natural phenomena are
arguably different from abstractions when considering this
characterization of discovery because many abstractions are not
necessarily "waiting to be found," but in many instances originate
with their conceiver.
While this argument is not necessarily true in all cases, it seems
that this characterization of discoveries as things that are waiting to
be found suggests that the likelihood of independent creation by
two or more inventors is increased with regard to things that are
discovered or are abstract, as compared with tangible inventions.
(1998) ("Each upstream patent allows its owner to set up another tollbooth on
the road to product development, adding to the cost and slowing the pace of
downstream biomedical innovation.").
258 See David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent
Policy, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985, 1001-04 (2005) (discussing various
theories on the existence of transaction costs in the biotech industry).
259 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 239, at 304; see also Christopher M.
Holman, Biotechnology's Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 318, 330 (2006) (observing that researchers of biotechnology
had not "stopped a project due to the existence of third party patents on research
inputs. In contrast, access to tangible property in the form of material transfers
was found to be much more likely to impede research.").
260 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 239, at 308.
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Creating something tangible, such as a machine or pharmaceutical
product, can require more research, development, and investment
of resources when compared to abstract inventions, such as tax
strategy methods. Although the creation of both types of
inventions can impose significant costs, intangible inventions are
developed mainly as a result of one's brain-work and are arguably
more likely to be developed by individuals than tangible
inventions, that more often require both brain-work and physical
resources under the auspices of well-funded corporations or
research laboratories. Furthermore, and as a result of this possible
difference, the increased likelihood of independent creation for
intangible inventions is linked to the constitutional legal concerns
that have been raised with regard to capturing abstractions. If the
likelihood of independent creation is higher for the creation of
intangible inventions compared to that of tangible inventions, it is
arguable that such inventions raise more constitutional legal
concerns because of their frequent occurrence. The higher the
likelihood of their creation, the more constitutive they are.
Sixth, major detection and enforcement difficulties exist in
relation to patents that merely capture abstractions.26 ' Naturally,
these major difficulties bring large costs. For example, consider
the possible infringement of a patent that captures the invention at
issue in LabCorp, pertaining to the correlation between level of
homocysteine blood test results and B12 deficiencies. 262
Identifying doctors who have employed the specific method
patented by the inventor, which pertains to doctors' diagnoses and
analyses of blood test results of patients, is not simple and requires
significant detection expenses. Furthermore, many abstract
inventions can be infringed by mere perception and analysis. 26 3
Thus, it is easy to imagine the problems that could arise regarding
261 id
262 See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921,
2921 (2006) (per curiam).
263 See, e.g., Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S.
124, 125 (2006) (per curiam) (pertaining to a diagnostic test used to measure the
bodily amounts of certain amino acids); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (pertaining to an application to
determine the amounts of insulin in the body); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (a probe isolating certain genes of interest).
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detection. Of course, such difficulties, standing alone, are not
reason enough to deny protection.264
B. Justice-Based Rationales
The Supreme Court's seminal decisions on patentable subject
matter eligibility identify two major justice/property-based
rationales concerning why laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas do not receive patent protection.26 5
The first major concern is that allowing patents over laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas effectively extends
protection over means that are not invented by the applicant. For
example, in Wyeth v. Stone,266 the patentee invented a new machine
for cutting ice.267 He stated in his patent application, "It is claimed,
as new, to cut ice of a uniform size, by means of an apparatus
worked by any other power than human. The invention of this art,
as well as the particular method of the application of the principle,
are claimed by the subscriber . . . ."268 Justice Story ruled that
"such a claim is utterly unmaintainable in point of law,"
explaining:
It is a claim for an art or principle in the abstract, and not for any
particular method or machinery, by which ice is to be cut. No man can
have a right to cut ice by all means or methods, or by all or any sort of
apparatus, although he is not the inventor of any or all such means,
methods, or apparatus. A claim broader than the actual invention of
the patentee is, for that very reason, upon the principles of the common
law, utterly void.. 269
264 There are other instances where major detection and enforcement problems
within IP regulation still exist. Copyright infringement by individuals on the
internet and tax evasion are both instances where enforcement has been a
difficult task for many years and where we still have regulation and civil and
criminal enforcement.
265 See generally JOSHUA D. SARNOFF, PATENTS AND MORALITY: RELIGION,
SCIENCE, NATURE AND THE LAW (2012) (discussing the immoral implications of
broad patentable subject matter).
266 30 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840).
267 Id. at 725.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 727 (emphasis added). It should be noted, however, that Justice
Story's reasoning is not necessarily accurate, as patent law effectively grants
protection to more than what was actually invented by the patentees. In the
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The second justice-based rationale is that laws of nature,
natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas are the handiwork of
nature and are merely discovered-thus the individual who
discovered them did not contribute anything to the alleged
invention. As a result, the individual's connection to the alleged
invention does not justify the endowment of a patent. In Funk
Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,270 the patent at issue was
for a mixture of three types of naturally occurring bacteria, which
together formed a general soil supplement.27 ' The key to this
invention was the identification and isolation of strains of three
different types of bacteria able to mutually coexist, thus allowing
one general application.27 2 The patentee did not induce the bacteria
to do anything beyond the bacteria's natural function.273 In the
Court's view, the patentee simply researched natural bacteria and
isolated three strains possessing the described properties, making
the discovery unpatentable.2 74 The Court drew the following
broadly worded conclusion:
[P]atents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature.
The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or
the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all
men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and
275
reserved exclusively to none.
Arguably, this reasoning is not entirely accurate. Although laws of
nature and natural phenomena, as well as abstract ideas, are part of
the storehouse of knowledge, the reality is that even the law of
infringement doctrine of equivalence, for example, an infringer is liable not only
for literal infringement of the claims, but also for infringement by means that are
substantially similar to the patentee's invention. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 738 (2002); see also O'Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853) (invalidating Morse's eighth claim because it
went beyond the means of achieving a useful result that Morse has in fact
invented: "In fine he claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process
which he has not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not
describe when he obtained his patent.").
270 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
271 Id. at 128-30.
272 id
273 Id. at 131.274 ad.
275 Id. at 130.
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gravity or the theory of relativity were "created" to some extent by
their "discoverers"-in that their discoverers identified and
conceptualized them and contributed at least to the descriptions or
definitions of the rules and theories. Regardless, even if such
discoveries do not reflect a meaningful contribution on the part of
the individual who discovered them (as discussed below), such an
analysis is not entirely applicable to creators of abstract inventions.
The value added by inventors of abstractions distances them
considerably from the discoverer pole of the spectrum. This is
because, unlike discoveries that can arguably be gleaned from
nature and are waiting to be discovered, abstract ideas, such as
mathematical algorithms or economic theories, do not necessarily
reside in nature waiting to be identified. Therefore, it cannot
automatically be assumed that abstract ideas are discovered and
should not be patented.
C. Constitutional Law Rationales
Another commonly articulated reason for why laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas should not be patentable is
the concern that such things are fundamental building blocks of
both scientific research and the creation of knowledge.
Particularly, abstractions are a critically important resource to
learning, culture, competition, innovation, and democratic
discourse. However, the Intellectual Property Clause of the United
States Constitution authorizes the granting of patents only in
instances where it advances the useful arts. Patenting abstractions
could impede the advance of the useful arts because doing so
would constitute granting monopolies on basic tools of science and
other critically important rules and theories that exist in society.
Considered in this light, abstractions are part of the public domain
because of society's unwillingness to allow their appropriation by
any one individual.276
276 Miriam Bitton, Modernizing Copyright Law, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
65, 70 (2011); Margaret Jane Radin, Information Tangibility, in Economics,
Law and Intellectual Property: Seeking Strategies for Research and Teaching in
a Developing Field 395, 408-09 (Ove Granstrand ed., 2003) (discussing the
impact of propertizing information on free speech); Pamela Samuelson,
Challenges in Mapping the Public Domain, in The Future of the Public Domain:
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Many patent law decisions have emphasized the importance of
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, finding
these items unpatentable because they are basic tools of scientific
and technological work. For example, in Le Roy v. Tatham,27 the
Supreme Court discussed the general problems concerning
patentability of "principles" and laws of nature, offering rationales
for their exclusion: "It is admitted, that a principle is not
patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can
claim in either of them an exclusive right." 278 Likewise, in Benson,
the Supreme Court emphasized, "[p]henomena of nature, though
just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific
and technological work."279
Identifying the Commons in Information Law 7, 7-21 (Lucie Guibault & P.
Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
277 55 U.S. 156 (1852).278 Id. at 174-75.
279 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). A few seminal Supreme
Court decisions point to the special status of abstractions. See generally Miriam
Bitton, Trends in Protection for Informational Works Under Copyright Law
During the 19th and 20th Centuries, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
115, 136-39 (2006) (providing a thorough analysis of the treatment of
informational works under copyright law). Justice Brandeis's famous dissent in
International News Service v. Associated Press contains a classic rationale for
denying legal protection to ideas and information, emphasizing their importance
and public domain status: "The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human
productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-become,
after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use." Int'l
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918). Similarly, in Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court accepted this
proposition and observed that copyright protected only the author's expression,
not his ideas-the latter being freely useable by anyone without charge and
without permission. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 547 (1985). Likewise, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., the Supreme Court opined that "raw facts [in copyrighted works]
may be copied at will" and that "[tihis. result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It
is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and art."
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991). As in
Harper & Row, the Court in Feist emphasized that "copyright assures authors
the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon
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Some scholars have even suggested that due to their
importance, ideas, information, theories, and scientific principles
are "First Amendment public domain" materials. 280  Thus, it has
long been suggested that they should not be the subject of either
patents or copyrights based upon First Amendment protections.
Furthermore, courts have consistently acknowledged that
despite the importance of abstractions, patent law does not protect
the most valuable aspects of inventions. For example, Judge
Frank's opinion in Schering Corp. v. Gilbert28 ' provides:
It is indeed something of a paradox, but, nevertheless, doubtless wise,
that our patent law gives no reward to the discoverers of scientific
principles, while it protects the discoveries and inventions of lesser
minds, who find new, original and useful applications of such
principles. No Prometheus is welcome in the Patent Office.2 82
Judge Frank's analysis implicitly suggests that capturing
abstractions through patents can raise significant First Amendment
concerns, such as the possibility that someone could infringe upon
an abstraction by merely perceiving and analyzing it.283
D. Structural Limits of the Patent System
As the historical review shows, the patent system was
structured with tangible inventions in mind, traditionally limiting
patent protection for inventions having some useful end. "Useful"
was interpreted very narrowly, encompassing things that are
physically embodied or that create some physical transformation in
the ideas and information conveyed by a work." Id. at 349-50.
280 See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to
Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 297, 326 (2004).
281 153 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1946).
282 Id. at 435 (Frank, J., dissenting); see also Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17
F. Cas. 879, 884 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) ("A discovery may be brilliant and useful,
and not patentable. No matter through what long, solitary vigils, or by what
importunate efforts, the secret may have been wrung from the bosom of Nature,
or to what useful purpose it may be applied. Something more is necessary. The
new force or principle brought to light must be embodied and set to work, and
can be patented only in connection or combination with the means by which, or
the medium through which, it operates.").
283 See, e.g., Collins, Propertizing Thought, supra note 67, at 317 (exploring
the claims at issue in Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 599
F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
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the world. Therefore, the system's structure does not accommodate
abstract inventions and also fails to incorporate any built-in safety
valves that would effectively respond to risks posed by capturing
abstractions through patents. The process in which courts have
responded to the development of the knowledge economy by
moving away from physicality has been both a blessing and a
curse; while courts have tried to accommodate new technologies,
the process has not taken into account the structural limits of the
patent system in accommodating such inventions.
There are sound policy reasons for being wary of permitting
the patent system to encompass abstractions. First, granting patent
protection to abstractions represents a fundamental departure from
the traditional patent bargain. The Constitution does not expressly
state what quid pro quo, if any, the inventor is required to provide
in return for the limited-term exclusive right encompassed by a
patent. It was only in the decade immediately preceding the
Federal Convention in 1787 that the common law courts decided
that an inventor was required to provide a patent specification
containing an enabling disclosure (an explanation of how to make
and how to use the invention).284 Once the disclosure requirement
was established, the patent system bargain became evident: the
exchange of public disclosure of the invention for limited term
exclusive rights in the claimed particular and tangible inventions.285
In contrast, patent claims covering abstractions, rather than
specific tangible claims to inventions, are potentially far broader
and could be infringed, at times, by mere perception and analysis.
This undermines the important policy of public disclosure from the
patent because the scope of claims for abstractions are much
broader and, unlike tangible inventions claims that disclose an
underlying (unpatentable) discovery, abstraction claims do not
contribute anything immediately for public use-or at least not as
much as the information that is disclosed regarding tangible
inventions.
284 See R. Carl Moy, 2 MOY's WALKER ON PATENTS § 7:5 (4th ed. 2010).
285 See Collins, supra note 83, at 1427-30 (arguing that patentable subject
matter is limited by a patentee's disclosure obligations); Kevin Emerson Collins,
Claims to Information Qua Information and a Structural Theory of Section 101,
4 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 11, 23-24 (2008) (arguing the same).
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While delaying commercial imitation, the traditional patent
bargain guarantees that granting a patent immediately enriches the
information base.28" By requiring full enabling disclosure of how
to make and use the invention, and by mandating that this
disclosure become freely available as soon as the patent
application is published and available, the patent system permits
unlicensed use of information about the invention, as distinguished
from use of the tangible invention itself. However, this assumes
that every patentee enriches the public domain with valuable
information that goes beyond the patentee's tangible inventions.
An enabling disclosure could provide the public with some
underlying concepts or theories that form the basis for a tangible
invention. For example, if Morse discloses the concept of
electromagnetism and patents certain means for using
electromagnetism for communications, the underlying discovery is
arguably free for all to use when the patent issues (unlike the
tangible application of the concept). Late-comers could rely upon
these disclosures and invent around the invention during the
lifetime of the patent. When the patentable invention is an
abstraction, this gap is arguably narrower. If what is captured by
the patent is an abstraction, such as the concept of
electromagnetism in the above example, there is arguably less
room for inventing around it. In effect, if patents issue that restrict
the public from perceiving and analyzing information about the
invention, the claim effectively defeats the traditional patent
bargain safety valve. This balances the interest of inventors in
earning a return on past research investments against the interest of
the greater public in promoting future research.
Second, even if some form of intellectual property protection
for abstractions is necessary to promote investment in the creation
of new types of useful abstractions, one might question whether
the patent system is the appropriate model. Unlike other forms of
286 See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124,
142 (2001) ("The disclosure required by the Patent Act is 'the quid pro quo of
the right to exclude.' "); Vincenzo Denicolo & Luigi A. Franzoni, The Contract
Theory of Patents, 23 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 365, 366 (2004) ("[T]he contract
theory [of patents] holds that the function of the patent system is to promote the
diffusion of innovative knowledge.").
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intellectual property protection, such as trade secret and copyright
protection, the patent system has very few defenses for patent
infringement that favor the public interest over the patentee's
rights. For example, in contrast to trade secret law, patent law has
no reverse engineering defense for patent infringers. Further, in
contrast to trade secret law and copyright law, the independent
creation defense is also unavailable. Unlike copyright law, patent
law does not offer a fair use defense that allows the public to make
certain publicly desirable uses without a license.287 However, there
exists a very narrow research exemption in patent law that is
applicable only for non-commercial purposes, such as pure
scientific uses.288 Prior user rights have also been expanded
recently through the America Invents Act to exempt patents, not
only over business methods, but also any type of invention.
Third, and perhaps most formalistically, attempting to capture
abstractions through patents could fail to meet important
patentability requirements, such as novelty, utility, enablement,
and written description. Arguably, capturing abstractions per se
does not meet the novelty requirement because something that is
287 See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine ofFair Use in Patent Law,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 1177, 1180 (2000) (arguing that patent law should adopt a
fair use doctrine-modeled after the copyright fair use defense-to help prevent
rights from becoming overly broad in the new circumstances of today's
high-tech world, and to authorize courts to weigh defined factors in deciding
whether or not to excuse an infringement as fair).
288 See John A. Gibby, Software Patent Developments: A Programmer's
Perspective, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293, 354 (1997) ("If a
process does nothing but implement a mathematical equation, and if the
equation and the process are so basic and simple that there are few if any
alternative ways to solve the equation, then patent protection would indeed
inappropriately preempt all uses of the equation."); Robert A. Migliorini, The
Narrowed Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement and Its
Application to Patented Computer Software, 10 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J.
135, 155-60 (2006) (suggesting to broaden the scope of the experimental use
exception to help maintain technological progress and preserve the U.S.
leadership in computer software technology); Richard H. Stern, Scope of
Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing
Business, 10:1 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 151 (1999)
(proposing the adoption of the doctrine of scenes 6 faire in patent law as a
means for limiting business method patents).
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merely discovered is waiting to be revealed, predating its
discovery, and is therefore not new. Abstractions also do not meet
the substantial utility requirement, as they fail to offer a practical
application as it has traditionally been understood. Patents on
abstractions would also violate the disclosure requirements, as
such a patent would capture all means, including ones the inventor
did not necessarily invent and disclose in her application. This
analysis is applicable a fortiori to laws of nature and natural
phenomena rather than to abstract ideas, which do not necessarily
raise similar formalistic issues. Abstract processes, such as the
ones discussed in Bilski and Comiskey, could actually embody
useful and practical inventions, even if they are intangible.
In summary, there are many concerns raised by patenting
abstractions. While some of these concerns are of major
importance in particular contexts, they are less relevant in others.
Therefore, it is appropriate to carefully consider these issues before
deciding whether abstractions may be patentable.
The next Part will explore a few case studies that shed light on
the value of this framework. It will discuss the patentability of
business methods, computer software, and diagnostic methods.
V. THE FOUR-TIER FRAMEWORK IN CONTEXT: EXPLORING
SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE,
BUSINESS METHODS, AND DIAGNOSTIC METHODS
The four-tier framework is a useful approach for analyzing the
patentability of abstractions. It demonstrates that although there
are many rationales for excluding abstractions, these rationales can
be disputed on some grounds and must be applied on a
case-by-case basis, exploring the specific abstract invention at
issue as well as its costs and benefits. The discussion that follows
explores the patentability of some highly contested subject matter
using the four-tier framework analysis. It should be emphasized
that for the purposes of this Article, the following analysis only
provides a general framework regarding the different contested
categories; the highly specific nature of the inquiries require
factually specific analysis that should be applied on a case-by-case
basis.
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A. Patenting Software
As discussed above, patent offices, courts, and inventors have
struggled with the patentability of software since the 1970s.289
After Benson, Diehr opened software's door to patentability if the
software formed part of a novel process and was tied to a specific
machine.290
After approximately three decades of quiet in the software
patents debate, the Federal Circuit decided in State Street that the
correct inquiry was whether software yielded a "useful, concrete,
and tangible result."29 1 In setting out a workable definition of
"tangible," State Street did not dispel the notion that numbers
alone could be tangible.292 Tangibility or physicality could be
achieved in software if the process transformed a machine, or if the
process was completed by some physical means. 293  However,
when, years later, the Federal Circuit addressed the patentability of
software again in In re Bilski, the majority opinion adhered to
Diehr's machine-or-transformation test as the sole filter for
distinguishing patentable software.294 The Supreme Court
disagreed, however, finding that the machine-or-transformation
inquiry, although a significant clue as to Section 101 patentability,
was not the exclusive test. 295 After Bilski, the USTPO issued the
289 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
290 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981) ("[W]hen a claim containing
a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or
process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the
patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to
a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.").
291 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
292 Id ("[T]he transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by
a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price,
constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or
calculation, because it produces 'a useful, concrete and tangible result'-a final
share price momentarily fixed for recording and reporting purposes and even
accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.").
293 Id. at 1376.
294 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[W]e believe our
reliance on [Diehr's] machine-or-transformation test as the applicable test for
§ 101 analyses of process claims is sound.").
295 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227, 3235, 3258 (2010).
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Amended Guidelines, which facilitated understanding of how to
apply Bilski.296 The Amended Guidelines set forth a non-exhaustive
list of factors practitioners were to take into account when
analyzing potentially abstract process patents.297 Not surprisingly,
the USPTO deemed the machine-or-transformation test as the
primary analytic Section 101 test. 298
Applying these factors months later in Research Corp.
Technologies v. Microsoft Corp.,299 the Federal Circuit ruled the
petitioner's software claims patentable under Section 101.300
Interestingly, the Microsoft Corp. court avoided applying the
machine-or-transformation test altogether, as it suggested that
Bilski regarded the test as non-statutory.30
Exploring the patentability of software generally, and
algorithms more particularly, through the lens of the four-tier
framework suggests that State Street's approach concerning
algorithms is the best standard the Federal Circuit could have
developed, given the need to accommodate technological
innovation through the patent laws.
In considering the economic objections for patenting software,
which contend that capturing abstractions can allow very broad
296 Interim Guidance for Determining Subject-Matter Eligibility for Process
Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922, 43,923 (July 27,
2010).
297 A condensed list of factors is provided in the Interim Guidance:
"[W]hether the method involves or is executed by a particular machine or
apparatus;" "whether the performance of the claimed method results in or
otherwise involves a transformation of a particular article;" "whether
performance of the claimed method involves an application of a law of nature,
even in the absence of a particular machine, apparatus or transformation;" and
whether a general concept (which could also be recognized in such terms as a
principle, theory, plan or scheme) is involved in executing the steps of the
method. Id. at 43925-26.
298 Id at 43925 (noting the machine-or-transformation test remains an
investigative tool and is a useful starting point for determining whether a
claimed invention is a patent-eligible process under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
299 627 F.3d 859, 868-69 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
301 Id at 868 ("[T]he Supreme Court recently emphasized this statutory
framework and faulted this court's 'machine or transformation' test for
eligibility as nonstatutory.").
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stifling monopolies, some camps believe that software should be
per se unpatentable because software boils down to algorithms,
which are abstract processes.302 Additionally, it has been argued
that there are non-patent rewards for creating software, such as
copyright law protection, trade secret protection, and other
business models such as first mover advantage.303 Because of the
difficulty in fitting software within traditional patentability
requirements, some scholars have proposed creating sui generis
protection for software.304 Yet, sui generis protection gives rise to
its own problems. Affording every emerging technology new and
unique protection would crowd the already overlapping and
complex field of intellectual property. Additionally, it might prove
302 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 194 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231-32 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
303 See, e.g., Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not All Bad: An Historical Perspective
on Software Patents, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 191 (2005)
(supporting software patents and suggesting that patents are superior to the
alternative mechanisms such as trade secrecy because they encourage disclosure
and provide the most economically efficient way of coordinating multiple R&D
investments); Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H.
Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308 (1994) (discussing the attributes and the
legal protection of computer software through copyright law); Joseph Robert
Brown, Note, Software Patent Dynamics: Software As Patentable Subject
Matter After State Street Bank & Trust Co., 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 639
(2000) (supporting software patenting).
30 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-
Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1205 (2002) (suggesting that patent
law be adapted to accommodate software by tailoring the PHOSITA standard in
a way that is detached from the sections 103 and 112 inquiries); Peter S. Menell,
Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1329,
1364-66, 71 (1987) (suggesting that Congress creates a new kind of hybrid
patent law system specifically for software where the standards would be
"novelty, nonobviousness, and usefulness," and the term of protection would be
shorter and would allow a limited amount of reverse engineering); Samuelson,
supra note 71, at 1134-35, 1149-50 (arguing that computer software should not
be patentable and that a sui generis scheme for protecting software should be
introduced, and suggesting that original object code and program source code be
protectable, providing software developer an exclusive right to control copying
and distribution of the code, preventing conversion of software program from
one language to another, limiting the term of protection to twenty years, and
other important features).
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redundant over time, as many industries can remain profitable
without any form of intellectual property protection by simply
relying on innovative business models. To date, there has been no
evidence to show that patenting algorithms has had devastating
effects upon the industry, and there are no clear economic
conclusions on the effects of patenting software.30
A software algorithm is a detailed method for solving a specific
computer problem.306 Examples of software algorithms include
methods for sorting, searching, fitting a curve to a set of points,
compressing files, encryption and decryption data, and maintaining
balance trees for data retrieval purposes. Patenting narrow
algorithms does not pose many problems. A software developer
has a choice of many algorithms when attacking a specific
problem, and most algorithms are also in the public domain.307
305 Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle
Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1633 (2007) ("So my observation amounts to
this: patents have not killed software. ... By almost any measure, the software
industry in the United States is doing quite well. Whether this is because
software patents are really in the end good for the industry, or whether the
industry has just learned to get by with them and maybe at times put them to
useful ends, no one really knows . . . . But the simple point is that the industry
has survived the onslaught of patents, at least reasonably well and at least so
far."). Compare STUART J. H. GRAHAM & DAVID C. MOWERY, Software
Patents: Good News or Bad News?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 45 (Robert Hahn ed.,
2005) (reviewing economic evidence regarding software patents and suggesting
that there is really no evidence that innovation was weak in the pre-patent period
in the U.S. or that innovation slowed down in the post-patent period and arguing
that rather than pursuing sui generis solutions to the challenges of patenting in
software, a broader effort to strengthen administrative procedures for
strengthening patent quality seems desirable), with James Bessen & Michael J.
Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent
Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2, 25-27 (2005) (arguing that patenting
software has bad effects on innovation in the field, bringing about high litigation
rates), and JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 187-214
(Princeton University Press, 2008) (suggesting that the major problems with
software patents are their low quality and failure to offer clear boundaries,
which in turn generates more lawsuits and higher litigation costs).
306 See Terry M. Walker, Fundamentals of Computer Science 8 (1975).30 7Algorithm: A Very Brief Introduction, THE LINUX INFORMATION PROJECT,
http://www.linfo.org/algorithm.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2012) (providing a
basic explanation of algorithms, including why they are critical to programming,
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Thus, because of these characteristics (and the fact that, in most
cases, patenting one specific and narrow algorithm will not impact
other developers in their ability to create the same result with a
different algorithm), the likelihood that patenting an algorithm will
create a broad stifling monopoly is unlikely.
The lack of impact also explains why there have not yet been
any devastating effects for follow-up developers of software."'
However, there has been no thorough discussion regarding the
possible effects of patenting software in software cases. With the
exception of a few cases discussing the preemptive effects of an
algorithm,309 most cases fail to explore this aspect in addition to
other economic dimensions.310
As for justice/property-based rationales, patenting algorithms
potentially allows patentees to gain monopolies over means which
they did not invent. Additionally, algorithms appear to be closer to
the discovery side of the spectrum rather than the invention side.
However, courts seem to proceed cautiously in exploring this
question, denying protection in instances of entire preemption of
an algorithm, as in Benson and Flook, while allowing the patenting
of an algorithm in instances where an application of an algorithm
was patented, as in State Street and Diehr."' And the argument
and suggesting that more than one algorithm can address the same problem).
308 See Jeffrey S. Goodman, The Policy Implications of Granting Patent
Protection to Computer Software: An Economic Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV.
147, 173 (1984) ("[N]ot all computer software algorithms are equivalent to
unpatentable natural laws. Rather, courts should view software algorithms, like
other scientific processes, as lying on a continuum between clearly patentable
and clearly unpatentable processes."); cf Eric W. Petraske, Non-Protectible
Elements of Software: The Idea/Expression Distinction is Not Enough, 29 IDEA
35, 49 n.28 (1988) ("In the field of programming, there are also collections of
stock routines that perform commonly-used functions.").
309 E.g., Parker v. Flook, 98 S. Ct. 2522, 2522 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson,
93 S. Ct. 253, 258 (1972).
310 E.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
3 Goodman, supra note 308, at 180 (suggesting that patent protection should
extend to computer software also because "the Court failed to recognize that not
all software algorithms are equivalent to natural laws" and that "like other
scientific processes" they are "lying on a continuum between clearly patentable
and clearly unpatentable processes").
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that the patentee simply engaged in a discovery rather than
inventorship of algorithms is not persuasive. Although algorithms
are simply logic-based ways to solve problems, the human
intervention in discovering and expressing this relationship
involves manipulation, innovation, and labor. Courts have not
addressed these inquiries explicitly or implicitly in many of the
cases that have discussed software patents, and accordingly, more
guidance is necessary.
The introduction of software patents initially raised many
constitutional issues. However, since the Alappat and State Street
line of cases, these concerns have been deemphasized by the
courts. A particularly vexing issue in software patents is the extent
to which software may monopolize mental processes because of
the potentially sweeping nature of its implications.312 Even mental
processes that involve post-solution activity"' are not rendered
patentable as a result.314 Yet software involving post-solution
activity with some practical application may be patentable under
Section 101. " These concerns could be easily avoided if the
applications are limited to computer implementation, thus allowing
the public to continue using mental processes without running the
risk of infringing them. Additionally, there is no evidence which
suggests that software patents have had any devastating effects on
the development of software.
Furthermore, even if patents covering preemptive broad
algorithms, such as the algorithm described in Benson, are weeded
out, concerns regarding the structural constraints of the patent
system still exist. The major problem with patenting software is
the long-term protection it allows for products with a very short
312 Gottschalk, 93 S. Ct. at 255 ("[M]ental processes ... are not patentable, as
they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.").
313 Le., activity after solution of the equation or algorithm set out in the claim.
314 Flook, 98 S. Ct. at 2525 ("The notion that post-solution activity, no matter
how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle
into a patentable process exalts form over substance.").
3 Gottschalk, 93 S. Ct. at 257 (finding that because the patent had "no
substantial practical application except in connection with a . . . computer, . . .
the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical
effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself').
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shelf life. These patents tend to be the result of very low
investment (especially compared to the more expensive types of
inventions, such as pharmaceuticals inventions), which arguably
makes patent protection redundant and risky for future
innovation.3 16
One could ask whether the machine-or-transformation test
hinges patentability on claim drafting as opposed to the substance
of the invention. Because this test remains central to the
Section 101 analysis, the same issues remain even after Bilski:
What degree of specificity suffices as to a machine or apparatus?
If a general personal computer suffices, would such superficial
machines render once abstract processes (e.g., the method in
Benson) patentable? If so, perhaps the patentability of future
software patents would depend chiefly on artificial distinctions as
to whether they are claimed as being tied to a computer, as
opposed to depending upon the inventive substance governing the
software. As to software and non-software patents, should the
individual inquiries under Section 101 differ depending on the
technology?
These open questions suggest that patentability cannot depend
on formalistic distinctions, such as drafting tactics. Algorithms
can be patentable, assuming they do not raise any of the concerns
discussed above. This could be decided on a case-by-case basis, as
State Street correctly suggested."
B. Patenting Business Methods
Business method patents can pertain to abstract business
methods, making this category particularly intriguing under the
application of the four-tier framework. Applying the framework to
36 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 305, at 187-214 (showing empirically how
patent protection for software brought about more litigation and other inefficient
results); Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents: Increasing Innovation
and Reducing Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of Software Patent Law, 25
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 191 (2008-2009) (reviewing the
genesis of the patentability of software patents, analyzing the social welfare
implications of recognizing software as patentable subject matter, and
examining recommendations for reform).
317 See supra Part II.D for the discussion of State Street Bank.
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business methods shows that they can and should be patentable,
assuming they do not run afoul of the risks identified by applying
the four-tier framework.
Exploring the patentability of business methods through the
lens of the four-tier framework suggests that many of the concerns
regarding granting patent protection to business methods are not
necessarily more significant or any different from concerns raised
by other classical and traditional subject matter categories.
However, business is largely driven by profit to the extent that
creative business methods will continue to develop in the absence
of patent protection. 3 19 As such, patent protection may disrupt the
competitive developmental balance which was struck by business
methods prior to State Street. Within that argument, business
methods may be more suited for trade secret protection, or even
under the traditional first-mover advantage doctrine.320
Another major objection common to patenting in general and
patents on business methods is an economic one: Business method
patents may be harmful to the business world in general by
conferring too broad a monopoly.32 ' This objection was raised in
318 See supra Part IV.
319 See Vincent Chiappetta, Defining the Proper Scope of Internet Patents: If
We Don't Know Where We Want to Go, We're Unlikely to Get There, 7 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 289, 322 (2001) (suggesting that "industrial arts
innovation, even when spawned by a 'eureka' insight, normally requires
substantial empirical follow-up investment to move from abstraction to
implementation" whereas "competitive arts innovation often only requires a
substantially more modest investment").
320 See Robert Hulse, Note, Patentability of Computer Software After State
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.: Evisceration of the
Subject Matter Requirement, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 491, 498-99 (2000) ("As
with purely scientific theory, the patent system does not protect advances in the
liberal arts. Liberal arts, such as economics and other social sciences, are fields
outside the technological arts. Because they are not 'useful arts' in the
constitutional sense, they are outside the scope of the patent system."); Sandra
Szczerbicki, Comments, The Shakedown on State Street, 79 OR. L. REV. 253,
276-79 (2000) (suggesting that State Street was wrongly decided because other
forms of intellectual property protection exist to incentivize the creation of
business methods and software such as trade secrets or copyright protection).
321 For example, has FedEx been harmed because they were unable to patent
their methods of efficient shipping or would patenting said shipping method
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Bilski, where it was argued that Claim 1 of the patent application at
issue, which claimed a three-step method for a broker to hedge
risks for purchaser-users of an input of a product or service
(termed a commodity), would allow a broad patent over the
concept of hedging in general.322
The arguments against business method patents have not been
empirically proven with regard to every business method. In the
example of the hedging method described in Bilski, it is difficult to
see how the method and its steps are broader or riskier than other
tangible inventions. The process pertains to a very specific context
and describes a very specific set of actions that need to be taken. It
also affects a limited field of business. The absence of tangible
elements in this process usually causes the courts and the USPTO
to automatically exclude the claims as abstract ideas,323 suggesting
that the courts and the USPTO accept the risks in such patents even
though there is no specific empirical proof.
Thus, compared to other classically patentable tangible
processes, it is difficult to see how such a process could create a
stifling monopoly. In Bilski, the application of business methods is
well-defined and known at the time of filing, and as a result
arguably does not introduce any meaningful risks. If, however, the
patentee would have attempted to patent the concept of hedging
generally without limiting its application to any set of
circumstances, it would have posed greater risks, and could have
potentially created a stifling monopoly.
As for the existence of other incentives for creating such
methods, this argument could be made with regard to other types
of patentable inventions. Additionally, it is unclear whether the
current production of business methods is optimal from a societal
perspective and whether patent protection will incentivize the
creation of even more business methods.
stifle the efficiency of parcel shipping and deprive society of the benefits
afforded by having competitors such as DHL or UPS in the field?
322 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3224 (2010).
323 See, e.g., id. at 3231 ("The concept of hedging, described in claim I and
reduced to a mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea,
just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook.").
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Another set of rationales commonly invoked against patenting
business methods are constitutional concerns. Abstractions are
perceived in intellectual property jurisprudence as a critically
important resource for learning, innovation, and democratic
discourse because they are critical and essential to human activity
at any level-including innovative activity. However, it is difficult
to see why providing patent protection for the hedging method at
issue in Bilski would have devastating effects on further
innovation. It is also difficult to perceive business methods as
basic tools of science. Much like a mechanical device that affects
a designated industry, a business method affects a specific business
community. It is difficult to see why the impact of the latter,
provided it is concrete, useful, and properly limited in its
applicability would be any different to that of the former.
Business method patents, however, raise some significant
structural concerns regarding the inability of the patent system to
accommodate abstractions. One recurring issue in judging the
patentability of business methods is the limited pool of prior art.324
With minimal patented business methods in existence, the USPTO
has simply struggled to distinguish patentable business methods
from obvious ones. Time is one cure for this issue because the
USPTO gains more experience as it examines more applications
claiming business methods. Other possibilities for curing the
problem include third party prior art submissions that have been
incorporated into the recent America Invents Act amendments and
that can significantly improve the quality of patents issued.325 Last,
324 See Kevin M. Baird, Note, Business Method Patents: Chaos at the USPTO
or Business as Usual?, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 347, 348 (2001)
(suggesting to impose an affirmative duty on business method applicants to
search the prior art); Andrew Kopelman, Note, Addressing Questionable
Business Method Patents Prior to Issuance: A Two-Part Proposal, 27 CARDOZO
L. REv. 2391, 2393 (2006); Bronwyn H. Hall, Business Method Patents,
Innovation, and Policy 16 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
9717, 2003) ("[T]here is widespread agreement among legal scholars that the
nonobviousness test has not been applied carefully enough in the case of internet
and business method patents and that lack of prior art databases have led to
many invalid patents issuing in software and business methods . . . .").
325 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284,
316 (2011) ("Any third party may submit for consideration and inclusion in the
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prior user rights, which provide a defense to patent infringement,
also constitute a built-in safety valve under certain circumstances,
provided that the conditions of Section 273 are met.3 26
In conclusion, patenting abstract business methods must be
explored on a case-by-case basis, considering the different
implications that capturing such methods might have on the
business world and other fields. While some business method
patents might have devastating economic consequences, others
might be limited enough to an extent that does not impede further
innovation.
C. Patenting Diagnostic Methods
Last, applying the framework to the patentability of diagnostic
methods, which have recently presented a challenge to courts,
suggests that their eligibility and the possible impact of patenting
them should be cautiously considered. As one might imagine,
problems can relate to any number of fields, including problems
with safety hazards, product development, or cancer research. For
example, in Corazonix, the method at issue sought to protect the
process of measuring and analyzing signals related to heart
conditions.327 The Federal Circuit deemed the method patentable
because the signals exhibited sufficient discernible physicality.328
Yet patentability of diagnostic methods does not always hinge
upon whether the data measured is physical. In LabCorp, the
diagnostic method at issue involved a method of detecting B1 2
deficiency by correlating the levels of other substances.329 The
novel element at issue was this correlative step. As such, LabCorp
record of a patent application, any patent, published patent application, or other
printed publication of potential relevance to the examination of the
application . . .").
326 See Defense to Infringement Based on Prior Commercial Use, 35 U.S.C.
§ 273(b) (2011).
327 See Arrhythmia Research Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1054
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
328 Id. at 1059 ("These claimed steps of 'converting,' 'applying,'
'determining,' and 'comparing' are physical process steps that transform one
physical, electrical signal into another.").
29 See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921,
2921 (2006) (per curiam).
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struggled with patenting observable correlations between
discernible indicators in the context of a problem and achieving a
solution. Thus, if facts are unpatentable because they are
discoverable and discoveries of facts lead to solutions of known
problems, can diagnostic tests designed to discover facts be
patentable?330 If the answer is no, would this discourage
researchers in any field from forging ahead with their research if
their novel, nonobvious research methods were not protectable?
After the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in LabCorp,
Association for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO"' (Myriad)
emerged as a particularly relevant case in parsing the boundaries of
diagnostic methods.3 32 In Myriad, the petitioners' process claims
related to a method of measuring breast and cervical cancer risks
and testing treatment of these cancers-processes which were
certainly within the scope of the Patent Act. At first glance,
however, Myriad's processes appeared to be nothing short of
complex data gathering-mining data and utilizing mental steps to
correlate this data into some result without any transformative
steps or tie to a. machine. In construing the process claims, the
Federal Circuit was mindful as to whether the methods physically
transformed the articles or whether the method claims were
"manifestly abstract" to the extent that they claimed only a
scientific principle.334 The court found the method claims
patentable because they were transformative and physical.335
Most recently, the Supreme Court issued its decisions in
Prometheus and the Myriad cases, which took a different approach
than that taken by the Federal Circuit in Myriad. In Prometheus,
the Supreme Court found that the personalized medicine dosing
process invented by Prometheus was not eligible for patent
330 See, e.g., Michael Meehan, The Handiwork of Nature: Patentable Subject
Matter and Laboratory Corporation v. Metabolite Labs, 16 ALB. L.J. SC. &
TECH. 311, 323 (2006) (suggesting that the claim at issue in LabCorp was not
patentable subject matter because it captures an unpatentable discovery).
653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
3 Id. at 1357.
333 Id. at 1339.
334 Id. at 1358.
. Id. at 1358-59.
JAN. 2014] 227
N.C. J.L. & TECH
protection because the process was effectively an unpatentable law
of nature."' Interestingly, the Court reasoned that the alleged
physical and transformative elements of the invention were not
"genuine applications of those laws [but] rather .. . drafting efforts
designed to monopolize the correlations."337 As to the claimed
application of the law of nature, the Court found it relevant and
important that the additional steps were already known in the art. 3
In Myriad, the Supreme Court addressed only the patentability of
DNA and cDNA, aspects that go beyond the scope of this Article,
and suggested that "[a] naturally occurring DNA segment is a
product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has
been isolated, but cDNA is patent eligible because it is not
naturally occurring."33 9
Applying the four-tier framework to the patentability of
diagnostic methods raises more concerns than the previous
applications to software and business method patents. Starting
with the economic rationales for excluding abstractions, there is no
doubt that capturing diagnostic methods such as those at issue in
Myriad, LabCorp, and Prometheus raises major concerns as to
whether doing so would lead to huge stifling monopolies. The
claims in these cases simply tried to capture a natural discovery.
Granting such a monopoly could be very costly for follow-up
inventors and society in general, as illustrated by Myriad.340 Such
a patent would provide protection for an invention-the boundaries
of which are undefined-and arguably every possible means of
employing the discovery even though it was not invented by the
discoverer. However, if diagnostic tests, such as those considered
in LabCorp, Prometheus, or Myriad, are in fact unpatentable,
future researchers could be discouraged from developing new tests
due to their fear of lack of protection, with the result that the
research or diagnosis of diseases will suffer and create the
concomitant cost to society. Government subsidies have provided
336 Mayo Collaborative v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).
33
1 Id. at 1291.
338 See id.
339 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2111 (2013).
340 Myriad, 653 F.3d at 1355-56.
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a major source of funding for basic research in order to address the
lack of incentives to conduct basic research and in order to avoid
the possibility of patenting its results. Therefore, as with a
growing patent thicket, if patent protection were extended to
research and product development, the grant of protection might
stifle, not promote, the progress of science because it could
potentially capture very broad monopolies.34 ' If patent protection
comes at too high a cost, perhaps a reduced, sui generis scheme
should be extended to diagnostic methods to help foster balanced,
protected research. If so, the same problems would complicate an
already overcrowded field of intellectual property rights.
Patenting diagnostic methods also raises justice-based and
constitutional law concerns. Because discoveries do not originate
in the discoverer, the discoverer's property interest is weak.
Additionally, from a constitutional standpoint, patenting diagnostic
methods could potentially violate doctors' and others' freedom of
expression to process information by affecting their freedom to
think and process information mentally.
Last, patenting diagnostic methods also raises additional
structural concerns stemming from the design of the patent system.
Capturing discoveries through patents is problematic when no
safety valves exist in the patent system for alleviating
constitutional concerns, which could permit the public to make
certain socially valuable uses.342
34' Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem?
Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 Hous. L. REV. 1059,
1079 (2008).
342 See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand
Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3
CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1 (2012) (discussing diagnostic methods
and suggesting that patentable subject matter doctrine performs functions that
are not entirely distinct from other patent law doctrine and are also not entirely
redundant to them); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent Eligible Medical and
Biotechnology Inventions After Bilski, Prometheus, and Myriad, 19 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 393 (2011) (suggesting that acknowledging the confusion in existing
subject matter eligibility regarding diagnostic and other biotechnological
inventions and recognizing the prior art status of excluded subject matter, such
as laws of nature underlying diagnostic method patents, will bring about better
preservation of the public domain and resolution of the challenges regarding
JAN. 2014] 229
N.C. J.L. & TECH
VI. CONCLUSION
The four-tier framework provides a better and more nuanced
scheme for assessing the patentability of abstractions. It sheds
light on the complexity of patenting abstractions and suggests that
rather than deny protection outright, the role of the patent system
in an evolving world should be reconsidered, particularly with
regard to subject matter eligibility.
State Street is the Federal Circuit's best response to society's
ever-changing technological environment. Abandoning the
physicality anchor and keeping an open mind regarding subject
matter eligibility, as is reflected in the liberal "useful, concrete and
tangible" result test, have been two major milestones established
by State Street.343 Federal Circuit jurisprudence, however, has
lacked guidance and coherence regarding the policy rationales for
such a move, failing to bring about the adoption of its policy. As a
result, it is not at all surprising that the Supreme Court's Bilski
decision failed to follow the State Street eligibility test and give
any guidance regarding subject matter eligibility." Today, even
more vagueness exists in this highly uncertain field. Denying
protection to Bilski's invention without any robust policy analysis
will require the Supreme Court to provide more guidance in future
decisions. One hopes that the Court will respond to this challenge
by addressing these concerns in its future rulings, and follow the
legacy of Jefferson, who believed that law should keep pace with
the progress of the human mind:
I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws
and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne
with; because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them,
and find practical means of correcting their ill effects. But I know also,
that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the
human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as
new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and
dia nostic methods patentability).
See supra Part II.D.
344 See supra Part II.E.
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opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must
advance also, and keep pace with the times.345
345 Thomas Jefferson, Reform of the Virginia Constitution to Samuel
Kercheval (July 12, 1816), available at http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-
new2 ?id=JefLett.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/pa
rsed&tag-public&part=244&division=divl; accord Alan L. Durham, "Useful
Arts" in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419, 1527 (1999) ("[W]e
must ensure that the patent system continues to function, even in areas of
technology that the Framers would hardly have recognized.").
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